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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF COLLIDING FIRST
AMENDMENT INTERESTS: FROM THE DEAD END
OF NEUTRALITY TO THE OPEN ROAD OF
PARTICIPATION-ENHANCING

REVIEW

Gregory P. Magarian*
First Amendment interests in both speech and religion often collide with
one another. A political activist claims a free speech interest in the right to
purchase advertising time on a television network, while the network claims a
free speech interest in its decision not to sell the time. A religiousenclave claims
a free exercise interest in having a dedicated public school district, while its
neighbors claim a nonestablishmentinterest in the government's not extending
the group special treatment. In this Article Professor Magarian examines the
phenomenon of collidingFirst Amendment interests, explains and critiques the
Supreme Court's failure to acknowledge and resolve First Amendment collisions, and proposes a new theoretical basis for resolving them: participationenhancing review. The Article first catalogues Supreme Court cases that
involve colliding First Amendment interests, including expressive access, religious accommodation, and religious speech disputes. The Court avoids confronting FirstAmendment collisions through two techniques: denial that one or
the other interest exists or matters, and deference to elected officials' balancingof
the competing interests. The Court's approach embodies a strong posture of
judicial neutrality, based on the concern that substantive resolution of First
Amendment collisions would interfere with elected officials'policymakingdiscretion. ProfessorMagarian contends that the Court disserves democracy when it
abrogates its duty to construe and enforce the critical protections of the First
Amendment. He proposes substantive resolution of First Amendment collisions
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under the theory of participation-enhancingreview, a variationon the familiar
theory of representation-reinforcingreview. Representation reinforcement theory
roots judicial enforcement of constitutional rights in democratic principles.
Representation reinforcement, however, cannotjustify substantive resolution of
First Amendment collisions, because the theory rests on a formal account of
democratic participationthat does not encompass First Amendment collisions.
Participation-enhancing
review, in contrast, rests on a substantive account of
democratic participation, which would commit First Amendment doctrine to
protecting the inclusive and informational attributes of democratic discourse.
Such an approach would lead courts, in analyzingFirst Amendment collisions,
to emphasize the distinctive value for democracy of expressive dissension and
religious pluralism.
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INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment imbues the Constitution with substantive
democratic values. The Free Speech Clause, along with the guarantees of press freedom and the right to petition for redress of grievances, posit open communication as central to our social and political
order. The Religion Clauses, with their intertwined commitments to
free exercise and nonestablishment, make clear that religious toleration and governmental restraint in matters of conscience play a central role in the functioning of our constitutional system. Beyond such
general descriptions, determining the precise content of First Amendment values requires continual evaluation and elaboration. Judges
and their critics often preoccupy themselves with the fear that judicial
articulation and application of constitutional values might overwhelm
the authority of democratically elected officials. John Hart Ely, critiquing and defending judicial review in Democracy and Distrust,sought
to address that fear by conceptualizing judicial enforcement of constitutional rights as a procedural aid to a substantive vision of democracy.' Despite the influence of the theory Ely championed, First
Amendment doctrine still reflects ingrained doubt that our democratic system can bear a robust regime of judicially enforced rights.
In both the expressive and religious contexts, legal disputes frequently arise that pit competing First Amendment interests against
one another. A political dissenter claims a First Amendment right of
access to buy advertising time from a broadcaster, but the broadcaster
responds by claiming a First Amendment right of autonomy to reject
the dissenter's ad. A religious group claims a free exercise right to
exemption from a generally applicable law, obedience of which would
seriously compromise the group's religious practices, but the govern1

SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

101-04 (1980).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:1

ment-or some objector with different religious commitments or
none at all-responds that granting the exemption would violate the
Establishment Clause. Sometimes expressive and religious currents
cross, as when a religious speaker claims a free speech right to use
government property or funding, but the government invokes the
Establishment Clause to withhold the resource. Collisions of First
Amendment interests present courts with harder challenges than
cases in which the government blatantly censors speech, or suppresses
or advances a particular faith. At the same time, First Amendment
collisions present especially pressing and important conflicts between
interests central to individual conscience and participatory
democracy.
Unfortunately, when the Supreme Court confronts colliding First
Amendment interests-whether in the context of speech, religion, or
both-it consistently avoids any substantive analysis of the collision.
Most commonly, the Court refuses even to acknowledge conflicting
claims of constitutional magnitude, instead denying salience to one of
the competing First Amendment interests. When dissident speakers
seek access to expressive property, the Court routinely invokes a rigidly formalist version of the public-private distinction, or reduces
speech protection to a simple matter of protecting the autonomy of
powerful speakers, in order to reject any First Amendment right of
access to means of expression. When religious believers seek exemptions from burdensome laws, the Court has variously ignored the free
exercise interest or the nonestablishment interest. Alternatively,
when legislation empowers an expressive or religious interest the
Court might otherwise ignore, the Court routinely defers to legislative
authority, thereby averting the need to make substantive judgments
about the underlying constitutional interests. In the Court's most
striking display of deference, it now treats both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause as virtually irrelevant to legislative exemptions for religious believers from the ordinary effects of
legal rules. Both of these approaches to First Amendment collisions
reflect an unwavering commitment to an ideal of judicial neutrality.
That commitment embodies the Justices' view that democratic principles compel restraint when First Amendment interests collide.
The Court's insistence on maintaining neutrality in matters of
colliding expressive and religious interests has deterred it from substantively resolving First Amendment collisions. This Article proposes
an alternative, constitutionally grounded decisional value that would
equip the Court to resolve collisions between expressive and/or religious claims: the advancement of participation in democratic self-government. Building upon Ely's theory of representation-reinforcing
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judicial review, which similarly attempts to base judicial assertiveness
on democratic principles, I label the proposed theory participationenhancing review. Where representation-reinforcing review validates
judicial repairs to the democratic process based on a formal value of
political participation, participation-enhancing review would validate
substantive judicial resolution of First Amendment collisions under a
substantive value of participation. The substantive participation value
embodies society's collective interest in public discourse that is both
informative and inclusive, and it highlights the particular importance
of dissent and difference for a healthy democratic system. In collisions of expressive interests, participation-enhancing review would
lead the Court to favor outcomes that tended to expand the range of
ideas present and audible in public debate. In collisions of religious
interests, the Court would favor outcomes that maximized the capacities of different religious believers-and nonbelievers-to participate
in democratic discourse on a full and equal basis. Participationenhancing review would not generate politically determined results,
but it would ground resolution of First Amendment collisions in a
broadly shared substantive value of democratic participation.
The Article proceeds in two parts, the first descriptive and the
second prescriptive. Part I catalogues the broad and varied range of
collisions between First Amendment interests and explains how the
Supreme Court deals with them. Through separately assessing expressive access cases, religious accommodation cases, and cases that pit
expressive autonomy against nonestablishment interests, Part I generates novel insights about First Amendment doctrine. The Justices
avoid substantive resolution of First Amendment collisions through
two complementary techniques: denial, whereby the Court conceptualizes First Amendment collisions as presenting only one sort of constitutional interest; and deference, whereby the Court yields to legislative
or regulatory resolutions of First Amendment collisions. Those two
techniques, their proportions adjusted to suit the terrain on which
each sort of collision occurs, characterize all three of these seemingly
disparate lines of First Amendment decisions. The case discussion in
Part I is dense and detailed because it comprehensively documents
the important phenomenon of First Amendment collisions within and
across the various fields of First Amendment doctrine.
Part II criticizes the Court's avoidance of First Amendment collisions and proposes the alternative of participation-enhancing review.
The first section offers an explanation for the judicial approach to
First Amendment collisions documented in Part I. It distills the idea
of neutrality as the conceptual fuel that drives the Court's practices of
denial and deference, and it explains why the Court's commitment to
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neutrality leads to inadequate decisions and normatively biased outcomes. The second section proposes the advancement of democratic
participation as a substantive, democratically legitimate basis for resolution of First Amendment collisions. It first explains how the theory
of representation-reinforcing review, which rests on a formal account
of democratic participation, provides a promising but ultimately insufficient template for adjudicating collisions of First Amendment interests. It then introduces the substantive participation value, which
embodies the informative and inclusive dimensions of democratic participation, as the basis for participation-enhancing review. It describes
the analytic inquiries participation-enhancing review would require
and addresses some likely criticisms. Participation-enhancing review
would provide a democratically grounded framework for ensuring
that the First Amendment, authoritatively construed by courts, governs collisions of First Amendment interests.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE TO RESOLVE COLLISIONS
OF FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS

The Supreme Court, in the contexts of both expressive and religious freedom, has confronted important lines of cases in which parties
on both sides could, and often do, coherently assert interests protected by the First Amendment. This Part identifies those lines of
cases, analyzes the Court's dispositions of them, and reveals the
remarkably similar modes of analysis the Court brings to bear on all
varieties of collisions between First Amendment interests. Although
the discussion encompasses a great many cases, I focus my analysis on
the First Amendment collision each case presents, in order to provide
a comprehensive catalogue of those collisions and to analyze the distinctive sort of difficulty in which they envelop the Court. This
exhaustive exercise is necessary both to substantiate the descriptive
connections I draw among the various lines of First Amendment collision cases and to enable the diagnostic, critical, and prescriptive contentions I advance in Part II.
The first section describes the several varieties of expressive access
cases-property, mass media, campaign finance, and copyright disputes-which set interests in access to expressive property against
expressive property owners' expressive autonomy interests. The second section describes the various permutations of religious accommodation cases, which set free exercise interests against nonestablishment
interests. The third section discusses a discrete line of religious speech
cases, which set expressive interests against the Establishment Clause.
Although speech and religion doctrines present distinct problems, a
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common pattern emerges from these three distinct lines of cases
about First Amendment collisions. In all three settings, the Court
shows great reluctance to recognize the presence of colliding First
Amendment interests. The Court routinely denies the existence, or
the salience for a given dispute, of one competing interest. In certain
cases, where a discretionary government regulation rather than a constitutional claim advances one of the competing interests, the Court
defers to the regulators, narrowing the scope of the other constitutional interest enough to allow the regulation to stand. The Court in
expressive access cases most commonly engages in denial, while the
explicit textual provenance of the competing interests in religious
accommodation cases has led the Court to systematize deference,
effectively deconstitutionalizing the question of religious accommodation. A persistent motif in all of these decisions is neutrality, which
Part II will identify as the Court's methodological focus and attribute
to the Justices' subordination of substantive First Amendment analysis
to judicial restraint.
A.

Conflicting Free Speech Claims: Access vs. Autonomy

The paradigmatic free speech case involves censorship. A private
individual speaks; the government, threatened by or disapproving of
the speech, attempts to silence and/or punish the speaker; a court, we
hope, prevents the censorship unless the weightiest interest justifies it.
In the late 1960s, however, the Supreme Court began to consider a
different sort of First Amendment problem', one that highlighted the
increasing importance of expressive property-such as media outlets,
shopping centers, and political money-for effective participation in
public debate. These expressive access cases typically pit a would-be
speaker's interest in access to an important channel of communication against the channel owner's expressive autonomy interest in
excluding the speaker. They present access claims similar to those
that arise in public forum disputes, 2 but expressive access cases involve
expressive resources controlled by nominally private entities rather
than the government and thus implicate the resource owners' expressive autonomy.
2 Cf., e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
809-10 (1985) (rejecting political groups' claims for access to a federal government
fundraising drive based in part on the government's interest in choosing its preferred
beneficiaries). In public forum cases, the government's incapacity to claim constitutional rights, including expressive rights, submerges any conflict between expressive
interests.
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Beginning in the late 1960s, a succession of scholars set out arguments for finding in the First Amendment some right of access to
means of expression. 3 Their arguments garnered early, tentative support on the Court. 4 More recently, two distinct critiques of access
rights have come to dominate academic debate. Libertarians of both
conservative and progressive stripes attack the idea of access rights as
contrary to what they view as a constitutionally compelled distribution
of expressive opportunities by economic markets. 5 A second group of
critics endorses the goal of broadening access to the means of expression through regulatory reform but rejects judicial invocation of the
First Amendment to enhance access. 6 Advocacy of access rights, like
any theory of expressive freedom, necessarily entails a particular normative account of the First Amendment's purpose and scope. What
access rights proponents and their critics share is an understanding
that access and autonomy are distinct, internally coherent, normatively rooted free speech values whose tension requires substantive
resolution.
In contrast, the Court has avoided addressing the tension. The
Justices confront collisions between expressive access and autonomy
interests in several distinct contexts-expressive property, the mass
media, copyright, and money in politics-but each line of decisions
generates the same narrative. The Court most commonly denies putative speakers' claims of access rights by presuming, with little or no
3

Important conceptualizations and defenses of expressive access rights include
73-74 (1973); OWEN M. Fiss,
LIBERALIsM DIVIDED 154-58 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH (1993); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 394-404; see also ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-28 (1960) (positing that "[w]hat is essential is

JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PREss FOR WHOM?

that . .. everything worth saying shall be said" and that "[t]o that end ... it may be
assumed that each of the known authenticated points of view shall have . . . an
assigned share of the time available").

4

See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (upholding a

statutory provision for media access based on the public's interest in receiving information); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 315-20 (1968) (finding constitutional right of access for expressive purposes to privately owned shopping center), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507 (1976); see also discussion infra notes 8-13, 49-56 and accompanying text (fur-

ther discussing Logan Valley and Red Lion).
5 See Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, ElectoralPathologies, and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1373, 1388-1405
(2007) (describing and critically analyzing the libertarian critique of expressive access
rights).
6 See id. at 1406-29 (describing and critically analyzing the regulatory reform
critique of access rights).
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explanation, that the First Amendment protects only expressive autonomy, not expressive access. These cases employ a rigid version of the
public-private distinction and an uncompromising notion of autonomy to reject access interests out of hand. In seeming contrast, where
legislators or regulators enact access reforms, the Court narrowly
defines aggrieved property owners' expressive autonomy interests by
reference to specific qualities of the expressive property at issue,
thereby allowing the access reforms to stand as a matter of government discretion. This move allows the Court to avoid any substantive
explanation of how and to what extent expressive access interests,
given legal force, challenge or complicate the primacy of expressive
7
autonomy interests.
1.

Claims for Access to Expressive Property

The quintessential line of expressive access disputes involves
claims for access to private property that has distinctive utility for
expression. The earliest of these cases produced the Court's only
explicit holding that the First Amendment compels access to a privately owned channel of expression. In Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,8 the Court held that the
First Amendment required a private shopping center to permit labor
pickets, notwithstanding the owners' property right to exclude trespassers. 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall placed the workers' First Amendment right to picket in the foreground of the case
and treated their interest in access to the shopping center as a natural
corollary to that right; in contrast, the decision treats the shopping
center owners' common law right to exclude the picketers as categorically subordinate to the First Amendment right.'0 The opinion, however, relies heavily on direct connections between state power and the
ostensibly private autonomy rights at issue. Justice Marshall-invok7

Commentators on occasion have suggested that all free speech decisions impli-

cate something like the expressive access problem. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling
Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1322-34 (1992) (characterizing free speech cases
in general as shifting costs from speakers to the public); R. George Wright, Why Free
Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 336-41 (2001)

(arguing that most challenged speech regulations can be explained by reference to
"free speech values"). Only expressive access cases, however, involve direct collisions
of free speech interests, and my analysis will demonstrate that the Court has treated
these cases as distinctively impervious to substantive First Amendment analysis.
8 391 U.S. 308 (1968), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
9 Id. at 324-25.
10 See id. at 313-15, 319-20.
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ing Marsh v. Alabama,1 1 in which the Court had rejected the efforts of
a "company town" to restrict expressive activity 2-emphasized
the
heavily regulated character of the shopping center and its functional
identity with the traditional public square.' 3 Although Logan Valley
boldly proclaimed the place of access rights in the First Amendment,
the Court's reasoning suffered from two glaring weaknesses. First,
reliance on the narrowly focused Marsh "public function" test left
Logan Valley vulnerable to a more nuanced state action analysis. Second, the Court's easy dismissal of the shopping center owners' common law property interest created an opening for future expressive
property owners to cast their exclusionary claims in the stronger steel
of expressive autonomy.
The first of those weaknesses ensured the Logan Valley holding a
short shelf life. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,14 the Court rejected a First
Amendment claim brought by antiwar activists who sought to distribute handbills in a shopping mall adjacent to public streets.1 5 Pivoting off the Logan Valley Court's prominent invocation of Marsh,
Justice Powell's majority opinion technically limited Logan Valley to
the specific context of picketing related to a property owner's business
in an isolated suburban area. 16 In the decision's key doctrinal move,
however, Justice Powell denied that the activists had any First Amendment access right to counter the mall owners' property right to
exclude them. 17 Subsequently, in Hudgens v. NLRB,' 8 the Court
acknowledged the primacy of the Lloyd Corp. Court's constitutional
analysis over its factual analysis and accordingly abrogated Logan Valley.' 9 In doing so, the Court manifested its wholesale rejection of a
First Amendment right of access to communicative channels: "[T] he
constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a
case such as this." 20 In rejecting Logan Valley, the Court emphatically
affirmed the constitutional status of the shopping center owners'
11

326 U.S. 501 (1946).

12

See id. at 505-10.

13 See Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 317-18 (emphasizing the functional similarities
between a shopping center and the Marsh company town).
14

407 U.S. 551 (1972).

15 Id. at 558, 569-70.
16 See id. at 561-67 (detailing the factual distinctions between Logan Valley and
Marsh, on one hand, and Lloyd Corp., on the other).
17 See id. at 568 ("[T]his Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited
guest may exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.").
18 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
19 See id. at 518-19.

20

Id. at 521.
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autonomy interests-although not, at this stage, identifying those

interests with the First Amendment-while categorically denigrating
the putative speakers' access interests.
Subsequently, however, the Court rejected a First Amendment
challenge to a discretionary regulation that gave speakers access to
expressive property. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,2 1 the
Court upheld the application of a provision of the California Constitution to allow a political group to solicit petition signatures in a privately owned shopping center 2 2-exactly the sort of access to which
23
the Court had found no First Amendment right in Hudgens.
Exploiting the second weakness of Logan Valley, the PruneYard challenge notably framed the shopping center owners' interest in terms
not only of property rights but also of the First Amendment right
against compelled expression. 24 As to the owners' property claim, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion found that the California access provision fell short of a taking and therefore raised no concern under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 5 The expressive autonomy claim
presented a potentially thornier problem. The Court in Lloyd Corp.
and Hudgens had denied the salience of expressive access as a constitutional matter, 26 but the California provision put expressive access back
in play. Had the PruneYard Court hewed to the prior decisions' singular emphasis on expressive autonomy, it would have needed to confront the tension between access and autonomy interests. Justice
Rehnquist avoided that confrontation by holding that the shopping
center's openness to the public and the lack of state direction behind
the speakers' message minimized the owners' expressive autonomy
interest. 27 The facts of this dispute therefore implicated no interest of
constitutional magnitude, and the Court could defer to the authority
of the state law. 28 The opinion failed to explain how those conditions
were any less present in the prior shopping mall speech cases.
The Court has continued to deny any First Amendment interest
in access to expressive property, and it has fortified property owners'
21
22

447 U.S. 74 (1980).
See id. at 77-79.

23
24
25
26

See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 85-87 & n.9.
See id. at 82-85.
See supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text.

27

PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.

28 Labeling PruneYardas a case ofjudicial deference to elected officials is technically inaccurate, as the "regulation" in PruneYard was a state constitutional provision
as authoritatively interpreted by the state supreme court. See id. at 78. No less than a
statute or regulation, however, the object of the Court's deference was a majoritarian
source of legal authority.

196
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expressive autonomy interests. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,29 the Court struck down a state regulatory requirement that a public utility provide space in its monthly billing envelopes to consumer advocates who opposed some of the utility's
policies. 30 Justice Powell's plurality opinion began by emphasizing the
public information value of the First Amendment, the central theoretical element in expressive access claims, but he quickly repositioned
that value to serve the utility's expressive autonomy interest.3 1 The
plurality treated the case as an instance of the government's use of an
access mandate to undermine a property owner's expressive autonomy. 32 The plurality distinguished PruneYard by asserting that the
utility had a substantially greater expressive autonomy interest at stake
than the shopping center owner 33 a position Justice Marshall echoed
in his opinion concurring in the judgment. 3 4 The facts of the two
cases arguably belie the distinction, but it demonstrates the Court's
increasing equation of property with speech. The plurality denied any
possibility of a First Amendment access interest for the consumer
advocates by equating access reforms with impermissible contentbased restrictions on property owners' expressive autonomy.3 5 Thus,
Justice Powell managed to condemn an effort to balance public
3 6

debate as "one-sidedness."
Most recently, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual

Group of Boston, Inc., 37 the Court unanimously sustained a First
Amendment challenge to a gay group's invocation of a state antidiscrimination law to compel the group's inclusion in a St. Patrick's Day
parade.38 Hurley represents the apotheosis of the public-private distinction as a mechanism for elevating property owners' expressive
autonomy and denigrating dissident speakers' interest in access to
expressive property. The parade organizers relied for their expressive
opportunity on a parade permit that the state granted them as a matter of tradition and routine, as well as other state support and funding.39 Beyond banning the gay group, the organizers' expressive
29 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
30 See id. at 5-7, 20-21 (plurality opinion).
31 See id. at 8-9.
32 See id. at 9-12.
33 See id. at 12.
34 See id. at 23-24 (Marshall, J., concurring).
35 See id. at 20 (plurality opinion).
36 Id. at 13.
37 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
38 Id. at 578-81.
39 See id. at 560-61. The opinion states that "the city allowed the Council to use
the city's official seal, and provided printing services as well as direct funding" but
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boundaries for the parade were indiscriminate; 40 in contrast, the gay
group presented a focused message. 4 1 Yet the Court cast the case as a
straightforward instance of government encroachment-in the form
of the gay group's reliance on nondiscrimination law-on a private
group's "autonomy to control [its] own speech." 42 The Court impli-

cated the gay group's litigation strategy in this public-private alchemy
by emphasizing that the group had foresworn any First Amendment
claim. 4 3 That strategic mistake, however, hardly accounts for the
Court's wholesale transformation of a conflict between speakers into a
linear narrative of government oppression. 44 In particular, the Court
went far out of its way to romanticize the expressive coherence of the
polyglot parade 45 and to inflate the danger that parade viewers would
somehow attribute the gay group's message to the parade organizers'
selective process4 6-even though the organizers exercised little selective judgment about the parade's content and even though most viewsomewhat cryptically notes that the organizers enjoyed those measures of direct support "[t] hrough 1992"-the year before the specific events that gave rise to the case.
Id. at 561. The Court's implication that the parade enjoyed no direct government
support in 1993 seems intended to buttress the parade's private status. But even aside
from the Court's opaque account of the facts, a momentary strategic shedding of
government support should hardly alleviate concerns about the government's role in
a nominally private activity, especially when that government support has for many
years strengthened the private activity's financial security and public legitimacy.
40 See id. at 562 (citing the trial court's factual findings).
41 See id. at 570.
42 Id. at 574.
43 See id. at 566.
44 The Hurley Court also explained its holding in terms of the parade organizers'
First Amendment right to expressive association. See id. at 580-81. Subsequently, the
Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), emphasized the same
notion of expressive association to block the application of a state's nondiscrimination law to stop the Boy Scouts from expelling a gay scoutmaster. See id. at 647-61.
Earlier expressive association cases had focused on protecting politically unpopular
organizations from aggressive government demands for information. See, e.g., NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1964) (invoking the expressive association principle to bar Alabama from demanding a civil rights organization's membership list). The expressive association doctrine's shift from a means of protecting
political outliers to a means of sustaining politically powerful groups' prerogatives
parallels the Court's elevation of expressive autonomy interests and rejection of
expressive access interests.
45 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 ("Rather like a composer, the Council selects the
expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and though the score may

not produce a particularized message, each contingent's expression in the Council's
eyes comports with what merits celebration on that day.").
46 See id. at 575 (asserting that the gay group's "participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council's customary determination about a unit
admitted to the parade").
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ers would have had little reason to know who the organizers were. 4 7
The Court's account of the public-private distinction turned the gay
group's expressive interest into a disadvantage, because the group's
"public" status transformed its desire for expressive access into government coercion of the "private" parade organizers to deliver an undesired message.
In its journey from Logan Valley to Hurley, the Court transformed
expressive property from a public resource that fosters dissident
expression into a private preserve that the Constitution shields from
dissident expression. 4 3 These cases reveal the basic template for the
Court's approach to colliding First Amendment interests in every
expressive and religious context. The Court initially takes First
Amendment access interests very seriously. In subsequent cases it
reverses course, using the conceptual primacy of autonomy over
access and/or the characterization of access interests as "public" regulatory affronts to deny the constitutional grounding of access interests.
On the other side of the cases, the Court grants exclusive constitutional force to the autonomy interests, which it eventually characterizes as expressive, of property owners, whose "private" status secures
their rights and relieves them of constitutional obligations. The Court
constrains property owners' autonomy interests by deferring to government access mandates in conceptually limited circumstances,
averting the need to analyze the relative force of legally grounded
expressive access and autonomy interests. In none of the cases,
despite their shifts in focus and outcome, does the Court squarely confront the existence of colliding First Amendment interests.

47 See id. at 562 (citing the trial court's findings).
48 Also arguably fitting within this expressive property rubric is a line of decisions
in which the Court has protected political parties' associational autonomy to restrict
participation in primary elections against efforts to expand the class of eligible primary voters. Compare Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 591-93 (2005) (rejecting
voters' First Amendment challenge to a state's restriction on eligibility to vote in a
primary election), with Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (sustaining parties' First Amendment challenge to a state's expansion of eligibility to vote
in a primary election). Reinforcing the autonomy focus of those decisions, which
primarily benefit the two major political parties, is the Court's solicitude for state
constraints on meaningful access to the political process for minor parties. See, e.g.,
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369-70 (1997) (rejecting a
minor party's First Amendment challenge to a state's ban on fusion candidacies). For
a discussion of party regulation cases prior to Clingman in the context of free speech
theory, see Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating PoliticalParties Under a "PublicRights" First
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 2010-60 (2003).
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Media Access Cases

The most prominent line of expressive access disputes, closely
paralleling the expressive property cases, has involved speakers'
efforts to gain access to the broadcast and electronic media. In Red
Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,49 the Court unanimously upheld the federal fairness doctrine, an administrative regulation that required
broadcasters to provide a right of reply to anyone criticized over the
50
Jusairwaves, against a radio station's First Amendment challenge.

tice White's opinion for the Court tacitly embraced the idea of a First
Amendment access interest, stating that "[i] t is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here" 5 1 and condemning "private censorship." 52 The Red Lion Court, however, did not impose any
kind of constitutional access mandate; it simply upheld regulations
that provided access. 53 Thus, the Court's only constitutional holding
was that the circumstances of the broadcast industry limited the First
Amendment's protection of broadcasters' expressive autonomy. That
holding rested on two interlaced features of broadcasting that justified regulation of the industry. First, Justice White suggested that the
public's interest in robust debate animated the development of the
airwaves and thus logically preceded broadcasters' autonomy interest. 54 Second, in an argument that echoes the direct attribution of

private autonomy to state authority in Logan Valley, 55 Justice White
emphasized that scarcity in the broadcast spectrum rendered broadcasters' property interests in their frequencies contingent and ulti56
mately controllable by the government.
A few years later, a pair of decisions exposed the weak underpinnings of Red Lion. In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,5 7 the
Court followed Lloyd Corp. in sealing any opening Red Lion might have
created for finding a First Amendment right of access to the media.
49

395 U.S. 367 (1969).

50
51
52

See id. at 369-71, 400-01.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 392.

53 See id. (upholding right of reply regulations as not "inconsistent with the First
Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of conducting its own
affairs").
54 See id. at 390 ("It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount.").
55 See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
56 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387-89 (discussing the scarcity rationale for broadcast
regulation).
57 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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The Democratic Party and a group of business executives opposed to
the Vietnam War challenged broadcast networks' bar against selling
advertising time for political messages. 58 ChiefJustice Burger's majority opinion emphasized that Congress and the Federal Communications Commission had allowed the bar to stand, reflecting a federal
policy of "permit[ting] private broadcasting to develop with the widest
journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations." 59 In a key
portion of the opinion that garnered only plurality support, ChiefJustice Burger argued that the political activists had failed to make the
showing of state action necessary for a First Amendment claim. 60 His
rigid application of the public-private distinction discarded the activists' interest in expressive access to focus completely on the broadcasters' interest in expressive autonomy. Recognizing a right of access "in
the name of the First Amendment would be a contradiction," he
asserted, because an access right would undermine broadcasters' editorial discretion. 6 1 The majority further held, notwithstanding the
existing structure of broadcast regulation and the diffuse character of
expressive access interests, that an access right would excessively
involve the government in determining the content of speech. 6 2
The following Term, the Court's decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo6 3 squarely rejected the notion of a First Amendment
access interest while also limiting the Red Lion allowance for access
regulation to the peculiar circumstances of the broadcast industry.
The Miami Herald Court struck down a state's requirement that newspapers provide political candidates a right to reply to criticism. 64
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion, creating the model for the
expressive property cases Pacific Gas and Hurley, categorically denied
the existence of any First Amendment access interest, based upon the
conviction that any government-mandated access reform would
impermissibly undermine the core First Amendment value of expressive autonomy. 65 The Court placed full constitutional emphasis on

the publishers' expressive autonomy interest, manifest in their editorial discretion. 66 The Court noted but disregarded the argument that
newspapers, by virtue of economic conditions, presented barriers to
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

See id. at 97-101.
Id. at 110.
See id. at 114-21 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 120-21.
See id. at 126-28 (majority opinion).
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
See id. at 243-44, 258.
See id. at 254.
See id. at 258.
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entry tantamount to physical scarcity. 6 7 Miami Heraldthus left the Red
Lion "technological scarcity" argument as a narrow, medium-specific
exception to the general rule of media corporations' expressive
autonomy.
CBS, Inc. v. FCC68 demonstrates the Court's recourse to deference in the media access context. Inverting the CBS v. DNC scenario,
broadcasters brought a First Amendment challenge against an FCC
regulation that required them to sell advertising time to political candidates. 69 Like the access mandate in PruneYard, the regulation in
CBS v. FCC circumvented the Court's denial of a constitutional basis
for expressive access interests, thereby seemingly compelling some
substantive judicial analysis of the access-autonomy tension. As in
PruneYard, however, the Court managed to avoid the issue by purporting to focus on narrow features of the expressive property at issue.
The Justices rejected the argument that the FCC regulation impermissibly burdened the broadcasters' editorial discretion, concluding that
the regulation "makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public
to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the
democratic process. '70 The Court, however, emphasized that the regulations created only "a limited right to 'reasonable' access that pertains only to legally qualified federal candidates,"' 7 1 and its
acknowledgement of the regulation's First Amendment value stopped
far short of recognizing an actual First Amendment access right. CBS
v. FCC thus solidified the hybrid analysis the earlier media access cases
had constructed. As Red Lion had established, the government could
choose to impose broadcast access reforms in order to advance the
public interest. 72 However, as CBS v. DNC had established, the government was under no First Amendment obligation to do so, 7 3 and as
Miami Herald had established, broadcast access reforms constituted a
limited, medium-specific exception to the prevailing First Amend74
ment concern for media owners' expressive autonomy.
The most recent electronic media access case once again upheld
a federal access regulation but sharpened the Court's emphasis on the
constitutional primacy of expressive autonomy. In Turner Broadcasting
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

See id. at 248-51 (discussing the economic scarcity argument).
453 U.S. 367 (1981).
See id. at 371-76.
Id. at 396.
Id.
See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1),75 the Court upheld federal "must-carry"
rules that require cable television systems to allocate space in cable
channel arrays to local broadcast stations. 76 The medium at issue in
Turner, cable, was technologically distinct from broadcasting-and
thus, like the newspaper in Miami Herald, not amenable to the Red
Lion scarcity rationale. 77 In addition, the government's must-carry
rules benefited a class of content providers rather than opening access
for particular speakers. 78 Based on these factors and a pointedly
autonomy-focused statement of First Amendment principles, 79 the
Turner Court applied intermediate scrutiny to ensure that the government had a substantial reason for undermining cable systems' expressive autonomy.80 The Court ultimately concluded that the must-carry
rules directly advanced several important federal interests, including
"promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources." 8 1 The Court's wariness of cable operators' power
to close important channels of expression suggests an implicit awareness of access interests. 8 2 Neither of the Court's Turner opinions,
however, locates access interests in the First Amendment or addresses
the tension between expressive access and expressive autonomy interests. 8 3 Instead, the Court sounds a refrain of wary but necessary deference to congressional judgment. 84 As in Red Lion and CBS v. FCC, but
under more stringent review, the Turner Court allowed a limited and
75

520 U.S. 180 (1997).

76

Id. at 185.

77 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 637-40 (1994)
(distinguishing Red Lion).
78 See id. at 643-52.
79 "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence." Id. at 641.
80

See id. at 661-64.

81

TurnerII, 520 U.S. at 189 (quoting Turner , 512 U.S. at 662).

82 See id. at 197 ("Cable operators thus exercise 'control over most (if not all) of
the television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's home [and] can
thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch."' (quoting Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 656)).
83 The Turner II decision followed Turner I, which identified intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 661-64, 668.
84 See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 196 (asserting the heightened importance of deference to Congress "in cases, like this one, involving congressional judgments concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity and assessments about the likely
interaction of industries undergoing rapid economic and technological change").
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qualified exception to the First Amendment's protection of expressive
5
autonomy based on special characteristics of the medium at issue.
The media access cases almost exactly parallel the expressive
property cases. After initially contemplating the free speech value of
access interests, the Court categorically denies any First Amendment
right of access to channels of communication while providing a strong
right of autonomy for owners of communicative infrastructure. Miami
Herald, the print media cousin to the line of electronic media cases,
affirms autonomy as the exclusive constitutional value in media access
cases, failing to consider how an access interest grounded in the First
Amendment might, or might not, mitigate autonomy interests. In the
broadcasting and cable contexts, the Court defers to legislative and
regulatory access mandates but-as in the expressive property analog,
PruneYard-narrowly defines the boundaries in which that discretion
may operate. In the media access cases, the Court once again avoids
the complication of determining how legally grounded expressive
access interests should affect its analysis of expressive autonomy
interests.
3.

Copyright Disputes

Copyright protection facilitates speech by preserving economic
incentives to create various kinds of expressive material.8 6 At the same
time, copyright protection suppresses speech by providing a legal
basis to enjoin publications that infringe copyrights. 8 7 In this Article's
terms, the incentive to create embodies an autonomy interest, while
the desire to use another's intellectual property in one's own expression embodies an access interest.88 Unlike the other topics discussed
85 See id.
86 See e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985) ("[I]t should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be
the engine of free expression .... [Clopyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas." (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 209 (1954))).
87 See generally C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L.
REv. 891, 899-919 (2002) (" [TI he Copyright Clause might be read to [make copying]
illegal

.

.

.

. In each case,

however,

the

individual's expression

constitutes

speech .... ).
88 Rebecca Tushnet makes the inverse analogy: copyright represents a government policy of regulating speech-infringing uses-that would otherwise threaten to
drown out the speech copyright protects. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model
for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign
FinanceReform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REv. 1, 35-37 (2000). She

thus compares copyright to regulations of broadcasting and political money, see id. at
60-67, which I associate with access interests, see supra Part I.A.2, infra Part I.A.4.
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in this section, copyright's collision of First Amendment interests is
complicated by a constitutional provision outside the First Amendment. The Copyright and Patent Clause authorizes Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science ...by securing [to creators] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings." 8 9 The close

chronology of the two provisions suggests that a proper reading
should give meaningful effect to both.
In a pair of decisions, however, the Justices have rebuffed efforts
to place First Amendment limits on copyright. Harper& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprisesinvolved a dispute over the initial publication of excerpts from President Gerald R. Ford's memoirs. 90 Ford's
publisher had sold Time the exclusive right to publish excerpts prior
to the book's release. 9 1 The Nation acquired an advance copy of the
book and beat Time to the newsstand, leading Time to cancel its contract with the publisher. 9 2 The Nation conceded that it had violated
the copyright and that its publication fell outside the recognized
boundaries of the "fair use" exception to copyright liability, but it contended that "First Amendment values" compelled a more generous
construction of fair use for news reports on matters of public concern.9 3-

The Court rejected that position out of hand. 9 4 Justice

O'Connor's majority opinion emphasized that "the Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. '"9 5 Accordingly,
the Court derided any notion of First Amendment limits on copyright,
beyond the longstanding distinction between copyrightable expressions and noncopyrightable ideas, as "fundamentally at odds with the
scheme of copyright." 96
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,97 creative users of copyrighted works that had
passed into the public domain challenged Congress' twenty-year
extension of the duration of copyrights as applied to works under copyright when it was enacted. 98 In addition to challenging the statute
under the Copyright Clause, the plaintiffs contended that the extension, although content-neutral, violated their expressive freedom. 99
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
Harper, 471 U.S. at 542-43.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 555-56.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 559.
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 192-94.
See id.
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Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion echoed Harper,characterizing the
Copyright and Patent Clause as not merely compatible with but supportive of expressive freedom.10 0 The Eldred Court tacitly acknowledged the First Amendment authority for the plaintiffs' challenge,
creating an opening for a forthright analysis of the colliding autonomy and access interests. Justice Ginsburg, however, sealed the opening, holding that, to whatever extent copyright restrictions implicated
First Amendment concerns, "copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them."''1 1 The safeguards
she identified were the same statutory constraints on copyright discussed in Harper the expression-idea distinction and the fair use
10 2
doctrine.
The speech-copyright decisions, like Lloyd Corp. and Miami Herald, deny the existence of a First Amendment interest in expressive
access while holding that the First Amendment necessarily and exclusively protects expressive autonomy. The Court's equation of copyright with free speech, like its analysis in the recent expressive
property cases, effectively transforms a property interest into an
expressive autonomy interest. 0 3 The copyright cases stack deference
atop the denial, in that Congress-by extending only a limited fair use
exemption to copyright liability in Harper0 4 and extending the term
of copyright protection in Eldredl°5-hasused its copyright power to
advance expressive autonomy while constraining expressive access. By
the same token, the Court's acknowledgement of the expression-idea
distinction and the fair use doctrine roughly parallels its deference in
PruneYard and CBS v. FCC to limited regulatory constraints on expressive autonomy. Rather than performing even a cursory analysis of
how the First Amendment's protections constrain or shape congressional copyright authority, the Court simply reads the Copyright and
Patent Clause as embodying the interest in expressive autonomy and
10 6
subsuming the interest in expressive access.
100

See id. at 219 (citing Harper, 471 U.S. at 558).

101

See id. at 221.

102

See id. at 219-20.

103

See supra notes 21-48 and accompanying text.

104

See Harper, 471 U.S. at 555-60.

105
106

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
The Court's strong pull toward deference in the copyright area-the one

expressive access context that entails a conflict between two distinct provisions of the
constitutional text-anticipates the Court's ultimate arrival at an extremely deferential approach to the problem of religious accommodation, where textually grounded
free exercise and nonestablishment interests collide. See infra Part I.B.3.a-b.
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Campaign Finance Challenges

The problem of campaign finance regulation presents a variation
on the collision between expressive access and expressive autonomy
interests. Campaign finance limits do not provide putative speakers
literal access to expressive property. Instead, campaign finance limits
constrain the use of expressive property in order, among other goals,
to alleviate economic disparities between unequally funded speakers'
capacities to participate in, and influence, political debate. 10 7 The
fundamental clash of expressive interests remains the same as in other
expressive access cases: proponents of limits on political money seek
to secure access to political discourse for underfinanced speakers,
while opponents seek to preserve the expressive autonomy of speakers
who possess the means to spend money. In this area the Court again
has rejected the notion of a First Amendment access interest and has
strongly vindicated the expressive autonomy of property holdersparties, candidates, and "independent" entities with enough money to
influence electoral debate.1 0 8 To the extent the Court has allowed
constraints on expressive autonomy, it has conceptually limited the
range within which those constraints may operate and has left their
definition to legislatures. 10 9
The full narrative of the Court's approach to colliding expressive
interests in the campaign finance context, from denial to deference,
emerges from Buckley v. Valeo.110 Entities that wanted to contribute
and spend money in political campaigns without any constraint challenged, as violations of their First Amendment autonomy interests,
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments of 1974"' l that limited the amounts of money anyone could
contribute to a federal campaign and the amounts candidates and
1 12
independent entities could spend in the course of a campaign.
107

See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment

an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 638-42 (1982); see also Colo.

Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Republican 1), 518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "[i] t is quite wrong to assume that the net effect
of limits on contributions and expenditures . . . will be adverse to the interest in
informed debate protected by the First Amendment," because those limits "tend to
protect equal access to the political arena").
108 See infra notes 110-124 and accompanying text.
109 See infra notes 110-124 and accompanying text.
110 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
111 Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 101 (a)-(e), 202, 210, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263-67, 1257-76,
1288-89 (1974) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 608, 609 (2000) and 2 U.S.C. §§ 422,
437 (2000 & Supp. 2004)).
112 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11.
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One theory of the provisions' constitutionality was that finance regulations prevented moneyed interests in political campaigns from silencing and marginalizing ordinary citizens of modest means-effectively
an expressive access argument. 13 The Buckley Court struck down the
14
FECA expenditure limits while upholding the contribution limits.'
The Court's distinction between expenditures and contributions
turned on the different degrees of expressive autonomy it saw at
stake. 115 Campaign expenditures, the Court explained, deserve the
fullest degree of First Amendment protection because they allow
speakers to inject expression directly into the electoral process.1 1 6 In
contrast, campaign contributions communicate the contributor's support for a candidate or cause, but increasing the amount of a contri1 7
bution adds only marginally to that message.'
In striking down the various FECA expenditure limits, the Court
once again denied the idea of a First Amendment access interest while
locating expressive autonomy at the heart of the First Amendment.
The Court dismissed the "equalization rationale" for campaign
finance regulation-the contention that expenditure limits were necessary, or at least permissible, to give people of lesser means a reasonable opportunity to influence political debate-by proclaiming that
"the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment."" 8 The Court gave no consideration to the equalization rationale's own speech-protective
underpinnings in a theory of access rights. The Court's denial of the
access interest in campaign finance controls implicitly depended on
rigid application of the public-private distinction. The Court discerned no cognizable claim of right to campaign finance limits
because it saw in the access provision only a governmental regulation
and not the expressive interests the regulation served. At the same
time, the Court classified officeholders, office seekers, and powerful
political organizations as purely private rights holders entitled to full
expressive autonomy."19 In letting stand what it saw as the contribution limits' lesser threat to expressive autonomy, the Court-as in
PruneYard and CBS v. FCC-deferred to Congress' prioritization of
expressive and regulatory values, albeit with only the prevention of
113

See id. at 25-26.

114

Id. at 58-59.

115

See id. at 20-23.

116

See id. at 19-20.

117

See id. at 20-22.

118
119

Id. at 48-49.
See id. at 19-20.
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corruption, and not the equalization of opportunities to influence
political discourse, as an acceptable regulatory justification.12 0 Mirror-

ing those other deferential cases, the Court's peculiar explanation of
campaign contributions' lesser value for expressive autonomy ensured
that its grounds for upholding the contribution limits would not translate into other areas of campaign finance regulation.
On occasion the Court has suggested limits to the expressive
autonomy inherent in political expenditures,12 1 while a recent decision held that even contribution limits can become unconstitutionally
draconian. 22 The essential structure of Buckley, however, has weathered three decades, and the Court has expressly reaffirmed the Buckley distinction between constitutional approaches to expenditure and
contribution limits.

123

Although almost everyone finds that distinc-

tion doctrinally unpersuasive, normatively undesirable, and/or practically pernicious, 2 4 it makes perfect sense in the context of the Court's
other expressive access decisions. Once again the Court strongly
affirms the First Amendment primacy of the interest in expressive
autonomy; denies the idea of a competing First Amendment interest
in expressive access; and avoids confronting the substantive tension
between access and autonomy interests by deferring to government
access regulations in what the Justices portray as a conceptually limited sphere of diminished expressive autonomy.
5.

The Press vs. Privacy: Bartnicki v. Vopper

In one recent decision, the Court squarely acknowledged a conflict between First Amendment principles that correspond with access
and autonomy interests. Bartnicki v. Vopper 125 presented the question
whether the First Amendment protected a radio commentator's
broadcast of a sensitive cellular telephone conversation-which the
commentator had not himself intercepted but had reason to know
had been intercepted unlawfully-between the president of a
120 See id. at 26-27 (accepting the anticorruption rationale for contribution
limits).
121 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding federal limits on
expenditures of "soft money" and certain expenditures for issue advertisements); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990) (upholding a
ban on expenditures of corporate treasury funds in election campaigns).
122 See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2500 (2006) (plurality opinion).
123 See Nixon v, Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000).
124 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign
Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 29-30 (1997) (summarizing the arguments

against the contribution-expenditure distinction).
125

532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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teacher's union and the union's negotiator in a highly contentious
and well-publicized labor dispute. 126 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, characterized the case as presenting "a conflict between
interests of the highest order-on the one hand, the interest in the
full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues,
and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more
specifically, in fostering private speech."' 127 Bartnicki did not involve
the sort of straightforward access interest present in the expressive
property, media access, and copyright cases, where putative speakers
sought to use privately owned channels of communication to express
their own messages. Rather, like the campaign finance cases, Bartnicki
involved diminution of one speaker's expressive property-the personal privacy that fosters private speech-in order to enhance another
speaker's expressive opportunity. 128 In affirming the radio commentator's constitutional immunity from prosecution, the Court emphasized that "privacy concerns give way when balanced against the
interest in publishing matters of public importance."'1 29
The Bartnicki majority's acknowledgement and resolution of the
conflict between informational and privacy concerns amounts to the
Court's most thoughtful and candid analysis of the tension between
expressive access and autonomy interests. Even here, however, the
discussion only scrapes the surface of the problem. Justice Stevens'
elevation of speech about matters of public concern helpfully suggests
a priority of First Amendment values.13 0 His opinion, however, does
not explain how the competing interests in the case-facilitation of
private discussion and dissemination of information-serve that paramount value. Instead, the opinion simply accords the informational
interest a categorical trump over the privacy interest, 131 effectively
inverting but not deepening the typical public-private analysis of cases
such as Hurley. The opinion is especially unsatisfying because the
expressive privacy interest at issue in Bartnicki strikes closer to the
integrity of natural persons, and thus arguably carries greater weight,
than the sorts of institutional expressive property at issue in other
expressive access disputes. The opinion also fails to flesh out why and
to what extent First Amendment doctrine should prioritize the dissemination of information about matters of public concern. Finally,
the opinion does nothing to enhance the Court's broader cognizance
126
127
128
129
130
131

See id. at 517-19.
Id. at 518.
See id. at 533-35.
Id. at 534.
See id. at 534-35.
See id.
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of colliding First Amendment interests. Rather than situating the case
in the context of the many decisions that have ignored or dodged the
presence of colliding speech interests, the Court treats Bartnicki as a
sui generis dispute.

13 2

All of the Supreme Court's expressive access decisions reveal a
common analytic methodology for dealing with colliding First Amendment interests. The Court recognizes a strong free speech autonomy
interest. It denies the notion of a free speech access interest as
entirely outside the First Amendment, placing the potentially competing interests on opposite sides of the rigid public-private distinction
and touting the conceptual primacy of autonomy as a basis for First
Amendment protection. On the infrequent occasions when the Court
allows access interests to encroach on autonomy protections, it defers
to elected officials' discretion, rather than invoking the First Amendment's mandate, and limits the encroachment to narrowly defined
conditions. This combination of denial and deference allows the
Court, in case after case, to avoid substantive consideration of the colliding First Amendment interests that expressive access cases present.
B.

The Free Exercise Clause vs. the Establishment Clause:
Religious Accommodation Decisions

The Supreme Court has confronted a substantial series of cases in
which religious believers invoke the Free Exercise Clause to claim
133
exemptions from the application of generally applicable laws.
132 Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Bartnickiprovides a more extensive analysis than the majority's of the First Amendment collision and connects the case with
First Amendment collisions in the media access and campaign finance settings. See id.
at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); Turner Board. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520
U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer,J., concurring in part)). Justice Breyer, however, makes
almost no effort to parse the underlying values at stake. Instead, he suggests a vaguely
formulated balancing of a statute's "speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences," id. at 536, and then offers a balancing analysis that focuses on privacy
expectations rather than speech interests, see id. at 538-40. Justice Breyer's approach
to the case reinforces the sense that the decision lacks broader applicability. See id. at
540 (urging a narrow reading of the Court's decision). He also evokes PruneYard and
CBS v. FCC by urging broad deference to legislative judgment. See id. at 541 ("[W]e
should avoid adopting overly broad or rigid constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict legislative flexibility."). Justice Breyer's earlier opinion in Turner II,
while more explicit about the nature of the competing First Amendment interests at
stake, takes a similarly imprecise and deferential approach to balancing those interests. See TurnerII, 520 U.S. at 227-29 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
133 The chronological scope of my discussion begins with Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), the first case to announce a robust doctrine of religious accommodation. See id. at 402-03. Earlier decisions that anticipated the accommodation issue
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These disputes, known as religious accommodation cases, differ descriptively from cases in which religious believers invoke the Free Exercise
Clause against alleged religious discrimination. The Court has made
clear that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from
going out of its way to target religious believers or institutions for special burdens.13 4 Free Exercise accommodation cases pose a more conceptually challenging question: when must the government go out of
its way to excuse religious believers from burdens applied generally to
all citizens? 13 5 One complication in this analysis is that when government goes out of its way to confer a benefit on religion, it raises a
concern under any forceful account of the Establishment Clause by
according favorable treatment to religion or religious believers. 3 6
Thus, religious accommodation cases set the Free Exercise Clause
against the Establishment Clause.
In the religious accommodation context, as in the expressive
access context, the Court finds a way to avoid the collision of First
Amendment interests. The Court takes remarkably similar
approaches in the two areas, once again employing in religious
accommodation disputes the techniques of denial and deference.
The principal difference between the speech and religion settings is
that the textual anchors of the competing Religion Clause interests
include Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-71 (1944) (upholding the application against Jehovah's Witnesses of a state prohibition on child labor they considered
a religious obligation); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-11 (1940) (striking
down the conviction of a religious speaker for inciting a breach of the peace tinder
free speech and free exercise principles); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-36 (1925) (sustaining religious educators' challenge to a mandatory public education statute under due process and free exercise principles); and Reynolds v. United

States, 98 U.S. 145, 161, 166-68 (1878) (upholding the application of a federal bigamy
prohibition against a polygamous Mormon).
134 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543
(1993). Religious discrimination cases do not pit free exercise against Establishment
Clause interests; if anything, government discrimination against one belief system may
reflect favor for another system and thus violate both First Amendment principles.
135 The issue of religious accommodation has inspired a formidable body of academic literature. An excellent introduction is the nuanced debate between Ira C.
Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992), and Michael
W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992).
136 Elsewhere I have considered the issue of religious accommodation under a
strongly separationist account of the Establishment Clause. See Gregory P. Magarian,
How To Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the

Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1903, 1970-72 (2001). The analysis in the present Article comports with any Establishment Clause theory that takes seriously the possibility
that religious accommodations might undermine nonestablishment interests.
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render denial of either interest unsustainable. Accordingly, the Court
has opted to marginalize both free exercise and nonestablishment
concerns in accommodation cases, in an especially strong show of deference. The Court lets both Religion Clauses operate within their separate spheres but abdicates to elected officials the responsibility for
assessing the competing interests their collision in accommodation
scenarios presents.1 3 7 This section will discuss the Court's approach
to religious accommodation cases by following a spectrum from the
cases in which the Court most clearly acknowledges constitutional free
exercise interests to present accommodation doctrine, which reduces
the First Amendment to a virtual dead letter.
1.

Mandatory Accommodation Cases

Mandatory accommodation cases involve claims by religious
believers that the Free Exercise Clause compels government to accommodate them by exempting them from laws of general application.
When the Court granted mandatory accommodations, it avoided analysis of the free exercise-nonestablishment collision by giving strong
effect to the Free Exercise Clause while denying any meaningful effect
to the Establishment Clause. When the Court struck down mandatory
accommodations, it conversely gave strong effect to the Establishment
Clause while denying any meaningful effect to the Free Exercise
Clause. The conceptual difficulty of denying effect to textually
grounded constitutional provisions, along with the practical difficulty
of reconciling the results in various successful and unsuccessful
mandatory accommodation cases, may explain why the Court subsequently has employed an extreme brand of deference to nullify the
38
doctrine of mandatory accommodation.1
a.

Mandatory Accommodations Granted

In a relatively narrow but important range of mandatory accommodation cases, the Court prior to 1990 held that the Free Exercise
Clause required accommodations. The leading decision was Sherbert
v. Verner, 139 which barred a state from denying unemployment benefits to a worker who had refused a job on the ground that it would
have required her to work on Saturdays, violating her Seventh-Day
Adventist convictions. 140 The Court in Sherbert declared that it would
137
138
139
140

See infra Part I.B.3.a-b.
See infra Part I.B.3.a-b.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
See id. at 409-10.
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apply strict scrutiny to mandatory accommodation claims. 14 1 Writing
for the majority, Justice Brennan purported to distinguish-but as Justice Stewart pointed out in his opinion concurring in the judgment,
tacitly overruled142-the
Court's recent decision in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 143 which had upheld a state's mandatory Sunday closing law
against a free exercise challenge brought by orthodox Jewish
merchants. 4 4 Braunfeld had justified the Sunday closing law as a mere
"indirect burden" 145 on the Jewish merchants' observation of the Saturday Sabbath that advanced a substantial state interest in maintaining a uniform day of rest. 146 The Sherbert Court, in contrast, found the
state's more concrete interest in preventing fraud and abuse in the.
unemployment compensation system insufficient to overcome the
arguably less direct burden that denial of unemployment compensation imposed on the Seventh-Day Adventist's religious observance. 4 7
Justice Brennan acknowledged the potential Establishment Clause
dimension of creating a special legal exemption for particular religious believers but shrugged off the problem. 48 The Court dryly
noted that "plainly we are not fostering the 'establishment' of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina"; rather, the Court was
simply upholding "the governmental obligation of neutrality in the
face of religious differences."1 49 Justice Stewart strongly criticized the
majority's failure to confront what he considered an undeniable collision between the Free Exercise Clause and the Court's Establishment
150
Clause precedents.
The strict scrutiny standard Sherbert announced for mandatory
accommodation claims grew notoriously short legs. The Court
applied strict scrutiny to sustain mandatory accommodation claims in
three subsequent unemployment benefits cases-Thomas v. Review
Board,15 1 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,1 52 and Frazee v.
141 See id. at 403.
142 See id. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
143 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
144 Id. at 608-09.
145 Id. at 606.
146 Id. at 607.
147 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
148 See id. at 409.
149 Id. The Court had just as easily dismissed the argument that the Sunday closing law upheld in Braunfeld violated the Establishment Clause. See Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592-98 (1961).
150 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 413-18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
151 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
152 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987).
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IllinoisDepartment of Employment Security' 5 3-that were materially indistinguishable from Sherbert. Those decisions simply reiterated the Sherbert Court's disavowal of any substantial tension between the Free
Exercise Clause imperative to grant accommodation and the Estab1 54
lishment Clause imperative not to show special favor to religion.
The only other case in which the Court mandated an accommodation
was Wisconsin v. Yoder.155 The Court there rejected Wisconsin's
attempt to enforce its compulsory student attendance law against
members of the Old Order Amish religion. 5 6 As befits an idiosyncratic decision, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority
adopted a quirky tone of sentimental solicitude for the Amish way of
life. 157 Even so, the Court again justified its decision in terms of a
"constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality" 158 whose
salience for the dispute the Court treated as self-evident. As in Sherbert, the Court acknowledged "the danger that an exception from a
general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul
of the Establishment Clause." 159 Once again, however, it dismissed
that danger-without any further analysis-in order to pursue "the
protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise." 160
These cases, in which the Court found compelling grounds to
believe the Free Exercise Clause exempted religious believers from
generally applicable legal obligations, provided ideal opportunities to
explain how and why the particular free exercise interests at issue
should trump the establishment concerns such exemptions raise. The
Court, however, passed up those opportunities, willfully ignoring the
cases' Establishment Clause dimensions. In this respect, the successful mandatory accommodation cases resemble expressive access decisions such as Lloyd Corp. and Miami Herald, in which the Court
153 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989).
154 See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 144-45 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409); Thomas, 450
U.S. at 719-20 (same). The Hobbie Court elaborated slightly on the Sherbert Court's
basis for ignoring Establishment Clause concerns, noting that "provision of unemployment benefits to religious observers does not single out a particular class of such
persons for favorable treatment and thereby have the effect of implicitly endorsing a
particular religious belief." Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.1l.
155 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972).
156 Id. at 234-36.
157 See, e.g., id. at 210 (explaining Amish communities' objection to formal education in terms of "their devotion to a life in harmony with nature and the soil, as
exemplified by the simple life of the early Christian era that continued in America
during much of our early national life").
158 Id. at 220.
159 Id. at 220-21.
160 Id. at 221.
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sustained expressive autonomy claims while rejecting out of hand any
constitutional interest in expressive access.161 The text of the Religion
Clauses precluded the Court in Sherbert and Yoder from directly following the course of those speech cases and denying outright the constitutional stature of the nonestablishment interest. The Court,
however, could and did disavow any role in these cases for the Establishment Clause.
b.

Mandatory Accommodations Denied

Notwithstanding the strict scrutiny standard of Sherbert, the far
more common result in mandatory accommodation cases was for the
Court to deny the accommodation claims. The Court used several different analytic techniques to reach these seemingly unlikely results,
but in none of the decisions did it consider whether and to what
extent the Establishment Clause placed constraints on the cognizable
range of mandatory accommodations. Instead, the Court simply
deferred to discretionary government decisions not to accommodate,
effectively rendering both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause irrelevant.
The Court ruled for the government in some mandatory accommodation cases by taking a restrictive view of what constituted a sufficiently weighty burden on free exercise to trigger the Sherbert strict
scrutiny analysis. In Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of
Labor,16 2 the federal government sought to impose the minimum wage

and recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on a
religious foundation whose ministry to convicts and drug addicts
included having them do unpaid work in the Foundation's commercial businesses. 163 The Foundation insisted that its specific method of
dealing with its charges was integral to its religious mission, but the
Court determined that the Foundation could satisfy the Act consistently with its religious convictions.1 64 While minimizing the claimants' free exercise interest, Justice White's majority opinion made no
mention of the possibility that allowing a religious organization's commercial businesses to flout federal employment standards might violate the Establishment Clause. 165 Similarly, a plurality in Bowen v.
161 See supra notes 14-17, 63-67 and accompanying text.
162 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
163 See id. at 292-93.
164 See id. at 303-05.
165 The opinion's only Establishment Clause analysis was its rejection of the Foundation's claim that the Act's recordkeeping requirements would impermissibly entangle the government with religion. See id. at 305-06.
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Roy 16 6 all but mocked a Native American family's free exercise claim
that requiring them to furnish a social security number for their
daughter in order to receive welfare benefits would compromise their
spiritual control over their lives while completely ignoring the Estab16 7
lishment Clause as a potential ground for denying the claim.
In another group of cases, the Court found the government's
asserted regulatory interests sufficiently strong to overcome any burden the challenged government actions imposed on free exercise. In
United States v. Lee, 168 Chief Justice Burger reached the apparent limits
of his fondness for the Old Order Amish, 169 writing a majority opinion
that rejected an Amish employer's argument that paying social security taxes would contradict his religious duty to provide social relief
independent of the government. 170 The Court found "the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system" too important to compromise in the name of religious freedom. 17 1 Bob Jones University v.
United States1 72 found the Court sustaining the government's denial of

tax-exempt status to a university that engaged in religiously motivated
racial discrimination. 173 Although acknowledging the burden that
taxation would place on the school, the Court subordinated that burden to the government's compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education.17 4 In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 175 the Court rejected an effort to block timber harvesting in a forest area that Native Americans used for religious rituals. 176
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion declined even to apply strict scrutiny, holding that the requested accommodation would impermissibly
interfere with the government's conduct of its internal affairs 177-an
analysis the majority portion of the Court's opinion in Bowen had also
applied to the government's requirement that the Native American
166 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
167 See id. at 703-04 (plurality opinion).
168 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
169 Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210, 234-36 (1972) (holding, after favorably describing the Amish's simple way of life, that a compulsory student attendance
law violated the free exercise ights of Old Order Amish); supra notes 155-60 and
accompanying text.
170 See Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61.
171 Id. at 260.
172 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
173 See id. at 612.
174 See id. at 603-04.
175 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
176 See id. at 451-53.
177 See id. at 447-50.
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family maintain a social security number. 1 78 At no point in rejecting
any of these free exercise claims did the Court assess the possible
import of the Establishment Clause for the requested
accommodations.
In a final set of cases, the Court determined that the government's pressing need to control prison and military environments categorically precluded application of the Sherbert strict scrutiny standard
to accommodation claims brought by prisoners and service members.
In OLone v. Estate of Shabazz,179 the Court applied a deferential "reasonableness" standard of review to uphold federal prison policies that
prevented Muslim inmates from attending weeklyJumu'ah congregational services. 180 Although the services represented a critical aspect
of the Muslim prisoners' religious obligations, the Court went out of
its way "[t] o ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison
officials" in connection with "evaluation of penological objectives.""8 1
Similarly, in Goldman v. Weinberger,182 the Court upheld the application of a military regulation to bar a Jewish officer in the Air Force
from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform.18 3 Once again, the majority acknowledged the importance to the officer of his religious practice but focused its attention on the government's pressing
institutional interests, emphasizing that "[o]ur review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed
for civilian society."' 8 4 Once again, the Court gave no consideration
to the Establishment Clause as a reason to avoid special exemptions
1 85
for religious believers.

All of these denials of mandatory accommodations provided a
context in which the Court could have measured the requirements of
the Free Exercise Clause against the limitations of the Establishment
Clause. The decisions, however, rejected the free exercise grounding
of the accommodation claims while ignoring any establishment con178
179

See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986).
482 U.S. 342 (1987).

180

See id. at 346-47, 349.

181 Id. at 349.
182 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
183 See id. at 509-10.
184 Id. at 507.
185 Justice Stevens wrote separately in Goldman to emphasize "the interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious faiths." Id. at 512 (Stevens,J., concurring). He maintained that, although a yarmulke may be an especially physically
unobtrusive religious symbol, any attempt to make practical distinctions between
accommodating a yarmulke and Rastafarian dreadlocks or a Sikh turban would impermissibly involve the government in religious distinctions. See id. at 512-13.
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cerns the requested accommodations might have raised. The Sherbert
mandate of strict scrutiny for free exercise accommodation claims
renders both sides of this First Amendment denial extremely puzzling.
On one hand, the Court seemingly should have taken the Free Exercise Clause more seriously as a source of accommodation claims. On
the other hand, the Establishment Clause could have-perhaps
should have-provided the Court with a textually anchored constitutional counterweight to the Sherbert-fortified Free Exercise Clause in
cases where granting an accommodation would have required the government to distribute an important prerogative inequitably between
religious believers and nonbelievers. Instead, however, the Court in
these cases opted to imbue government regulatory interests with
greater force than they have ever enjoyed in any other arena where
the Court applies strict scrutiny, overwhelming the asserted free exercise interests while rendering establishment concerns irrelevant. As
such, these cases resemble deferential free speech decisions such as
PruneYard and CBS v. FCC, in which the Court subordinated a seemingly significant First Amendment interest not to a contrary First
Amendment interest, but rather to the government's regulatory
18 6
priorities.
2.

Permissive Accommodation Cases

In the permissive accommodation scenario, the government
chooses to grant an accommodation to religious believers, and
nonbeneficiaries challenge the grant under the Establishment Clause.
The Court's use of denial and deference in these cases produced
mixed outcomes prior to 1990. In the cases that upheld permissive
accommodations against Establishment Clause challenges, the Court
intimated connections between the accommodations and strong free
exercise interests-but carefully avoided actual reliance on the Free
Exercise Clause-while denying the salience of the claimed nonestablishment interests. Conversely, in the cases that struck down permissive accommodations under the Establishment Clause, the Court
denied the salience of the free exercise interests claimed to defend
the accommodations.
a.

Permissive Accommodations Upheld

In Walz v. Tax Commission,18 7 the Court upheld a New York City
tax exemption for religious property, authorized by a state constitu186
187

See supra notes 21-28, 68-71 and accompanying text.
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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tional provision that preserved exemptions for property "'used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes. '

'1 8

Chief

Justice Burger began his discussion with perhaps the Court's most
forthright acknowledgement of the tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, "both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would
tend to clash with the other."18 9 His prescription, however, was to
find "play in the joints" between the two clauses, 190 and the analysis
that followed ran headlong from the implications of both. Religious
accommodations, the Walz Court declared, reflect the inescapable
truth that "[g] overnments have not always been tolerant of religious
activity,"' 9 1 but the Free Exercise Clause itself mandates no more than
"noninterference" with religion. 192 On the other side, nonestablishment represents a serious constitutional policy with deep historical
roots, 193 but letting churches operate free of the obligations others
must bear merely establishes a minimal level of "benevolent neutrality
toward churches and religious exercise generally." 19 4 Walz validated
substantial government financial accommodation of activities critical
to many people's religious worship. 9 5 Yet, according to the Supreme
Court, the two constitutional provisions that speak directly to the delicate relationship between government and religion have nothing to
19 6
do with that result.
The Court in Corporationof the PresidingBishop of the Church ofJesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos' 9 7 upheld the application to a

church's secular nonprofit activities of a federal law that exempted
religious employers from prohibitions on religious employment discrimination. 9 8 The Court did not reach the question of whether the
Free Exercise Clause required the exemption, 199 and Justice White's
majority opinion relied heavily on the Walz "play in the joints" formu188 Id. at 666-67 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1).
189 Id. at 668-69.
190 Id. at 669.
191 Id. at 673.
192 Id.
193 See id. at 668 (discussing the historical foundations of the Establishment
Clause).
194 Id. at 676-77.
195 See id. at 680.
196 See id. at 679-80.
197 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
198 Id. at 338-40.
199 See id. at 339 n.17.
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The opin-

ion did, however, identify the nondiscrimination law as potentially
imposing "a significant burden on a religious organization." 20 1 That
burden would appear to have been countered by a comparably significant establishment concern. The claimed establishment in Walz had
been a common, time-tested benefit, enjoyed by educafional and charitable institutions as well as churches and extracted almost imperceptibly from the mass of taxpayers. 20 2 In contrast, Amos involved specific
governmental authorization for churches, and only churches, to discriminate against individual employees. 20 3 Justice White, however,
found the establishment concern trivial.20 4 Substantively, under the
Lemon analysis, 20 5 the statute had the "secular purpose" of
"alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference with the ability of
religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
206
missions."
The decisions in Walz and Amos took care to maintain a squarely
nonconstitutional basis for the religious accommodations they
upheld, ensuring the primacy of legislative authority rather than any
free exercise mandate. At the same time, both decisions denied the
establishment concerns raised by government decisions to accommodate religion, placing seemingly pivotal decisions about tax benefits
and employment discrimination outside the scope of the Establishment Clause. These cases allowed the government's regulatory discretion to overcome the posited nonestablishment interests, just as the
unsuccessful mandatory accommodation cases allowed the government's regulatory discretion to overcome the posited free exercise
interests. Both sets of cases, like PruneYard and CBS v. FCC in the
speech context, 20 7 marginalize one First Amendment interest while
deferring to regulatory decisions that advance the other.

200 See id. at 334 (employing the Walz analysis of the relationship between accommodation and the Free Exercise Clause).
201 Id. at 336.
202 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970).
203 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 329-31.
204 See id. at 334-38.
205 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (setting forth the Establishment Clause requirements that a challenged government action have a primarily
secular purpose, have a principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and not excessively entangle government with religion).
206 Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
207 See supra notes 21-28, 68-71 and accompanying text.
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Permissive Accommodations Struck Down

The Court on occasion has struck down permissive accommodations under the Establishment Clause. In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc.,208 the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that required all
employers to relieve Sabbatarians of work on their Sabbaths.2 0 9 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the strictly religious character of the accommodation and noted that the statute
imposed costs both on employers, who had to bear the burden of Sabbatarian employees' limited availability, and on non-Sabbatarian
employees, who both missed out on the statute's benefit and had to
compensate for its cost.2 1 0 Accordingly, the Court found that the statute lacked the secular purpose required under the Lemon Establishment Clause test.2 1 1 Although observance of a Sabbath occupies a
central place in many different religious traditions, the majority made
no mention of the Free Exercise Clause. Justice O'Connor's concurrence explains the omission: the Court does not consider the Free
Exercise Clause applicable to private employers. 2 12 However, given
the holding in Sherbert that states may not deny benefits to private sector employees fired for observing their Sabbaths, 2 13 a decision that
turns on the state's power to mandate accommodation of Sabbatarians by private sector employers would seem to implicate the Free
Exercise Clause. Rather than assessing the competing First Amendment interests at stake in the Connecticut scheme, the Court simply
2 14
left the free exercise interest out of its analysis.
208 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
209 See id. at 710-11.
210 See id. at 708-10.
211 See id. at 709-11.
212 See id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting the nonapplicability of the
Free Exercise Clause mandate to the accommodation of private employees).
213 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963); supra notes 139-50 and
accompanying text.
214 The Court reached a similar result in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116
(1982), which struck down on Establishment Clause grounds a Massachusetts statute
that allowed churches to veto the issuance of liquor licenses for nearby businesses. See
id. at 120-27. Although the statute was defended as necessary to "protect" religious
institutions, see id. at 120, no Free Exercise Clause argument arose in the case. When
the Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,432 U.S. 63 (1977), rejected a Saturday Sabbatarian's argument that the Title VII prohibition on religious discrimination
required his employer to relieve him from work on Saturdays,Justice White's majority
opinion suggested that such an accommodation would discriminate against nonreligious employees, see id. at 80-81, although the case implicated neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause.
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The Court achieved the same outcome by different means in
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.2 15 That case, which struck down a state
sales tax exemption for religious periodicals, 2 16 yielded a splintered
majority. Justice Brennan, writing for a three-Justice plurality, emphasized that here, like in Thornton and unlike the superficially similar
situation in Walz, only religious believers enjoyed the governmental
benefit. 2 17 Accordingly, the statute raised serious Establishment
Clause concerns. Unlike in Thornton, however, the exemption in
Texas Monthly directly alleviated a burden imposed by government.
Thus, the case squarely presented a competing free exercise interest.
Even so, both the plurality and the principal concurrence found ways
to ignore the conflict. Justice Brennan dismissed the interest in taxfree publication as simply too remote from the core of religious belief
and activity to animate a mandatory accommodation 218 or, in the
alternative, insufficiently weighty to overcome the government's interest in uniform tax collection. 2 19 Justice Blackmun's opinion concurring in the judgment purported to confront the collision between free
exercise and nonestablishment interests, and posited the solution of
extending the exemption to nonreligious but comparably conscientious publications. 220 Rather than substantiate and defend that alternative, however, he reverted to the theme of the Court's occasional
allowances for expressive access-judicial humility and deference to
legislative discretion, which in this case paradoxically required him to
22 1
strike the statute down.
These cases might have provided occasions for considering
whether the Free Exercise Clause required, or at least authorized, the
challenged accommodations in a manner that might have countered
or complicated the Court's Establishment Clause analysis. The Court,
however, avoided any such juxtaposition of First Amendment interests. Instead, inverting its reliance in Sherbert and Yoder on the Free
Exercise Clause to exempt religious believers from legal obligations
while denying the salience of the Establishment Clause, 222 the Court
in Thornton and Texas Monthly invoked the Establishment Clause to
restore legal burdens on religious believers while denying the salience
of the Free Exercise Clause. Both sets of decisions echo speech cases
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

489 U.S. 1 (1989).
Id. at 25 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 11-13.
See id. at 18.
See id. at 19-20.
See id. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See id. at 28.
See supra notes 139-60 and accompanying text.
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such as Lloyd Corp. and Miami Herald, in which the Court denied the
existence of a First Amendment right to expressive access. 223 As noted
above in connection with the successful mandatory accommodation
cases, however, the shared textual pedigree of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses undermines efforts to deny either competing
religious interest. 22 4 The Court has decisively addressed this problem
by falling back hard on its other patented collision-avoiding technique: deference.
3.

Employment Division v. Smith and Judicial Abstention from
Constitutional Questions of Religious Accommodation

The religious accommodation landscape changed dramatically in
1990 when the Court in Employment Division v. Smith 225 effectively
eliminated mandatory accommodations. 226 The Smith Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause rarely if ever compels the government to provide religious accommodations. 227 At the same time, the Court
encouraged legislators and regulators to accommodate religious interests where they deem accommodation appropriate, without regard to
the Establishment Clause. Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause in
accommodation disputes while ignoring the significance of the Establishment Clause allowed the Court to accelerate and perfect its move
from the earlier cases that rejected mandatory accommodation claims,
as well as those that upheld permissive accommodations, to deconstitutionalize conflicts between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
a.

The Smith Decision

Smith involved a challenge by Native Americans to their denial of
unemployment benefits on the ground that they had been fired for
cause. The plaintiffs' employer, a drug treatment center, had fired
them for using peyote, an illegal drug that their religion considered
sacramental. 22 8 Justice Scalia's majority opinion, in Smith has grown
notorious for its doctrinal contortions in defense of his surprising declaration that "[w]e have never held that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
223
224
225
226
227
228

See supra notes 14-17, 63-67 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.l.a.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See id. at 890.
Id.
See id. at 872.
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prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." 229 The facts of
Smith fell within the one line of mandatory accommodation decisions-the unemployment benefits cases-in which the Court had
consistently applied strict scrutiny to require religious accommodations. 230 Justice Scalia, however, neither followed that line of decisions nor disavowed it. Instead, he distinguished the earlier cases on
23 1
the grounds that they had not involved violations of criminal law

and had involved "a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,"23 2 never
explaining why either of those distinctions should make a difference.
The opinion distinguished Yoder and earlier decisions on the ground
that they arose not just under the Free Exercise Clause but also under
some other constitutional provision23-thereby spawning the
alchemical "hybrid rights" doctrine, which lower courts have spent fifteen futile years trying to render meaningful. 234 These highly suspect
distinctions allowed the Court to use Smith as a vehicle for denying the
force of the Free Exercise Clause over the full range of religious
accommodation claims.
One might have expected the Court to explain such a sweeping
disavowal of free exercise accommodations, at least in part, by reference to the Establishment Clause. Indeed, when he turned from the
asserted lack of precedent for mandatory accommodations to affirmative problems with the doctrine, Justice Scalia spoke in terms that resonate vaguely with Establishment Clause concerns about
accommodations: the danger of giving religious believers "a private
right to ignore generally applicable laws" 235 and the fear of "a system
in which each conscience is a law unto itself."236 He hinted at a differ-

ent sort of Establishment Clause concern in making the questionable
assertion that mandatory accommodations required courts to make
229 Id. at 878-79.
230 See supra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
231 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
232 Id. at 884.
233 See id. at 881-82.
234 See Steven H. Aden & LeeJ. Strang, When a "Rule"Doesn't Rule: The Failureof the
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "HybridRights Exception, "108 PENN ST. L. REV.
573, 587-605 (2003) (reviewing lower courts' experience in applying hybrid rights
doctrine and finding the doctrine ineffectual). The practical failure of the hybrid
rights doctrine confirms Michael McConnell's early suggestion that "the notion of
'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder." See Michael
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109,
1121 (1990).

235
236

Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
Id. at 890.
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unsavory judgments about the "centrality" of particular religious practices. 23 7 In the end, however, the Smith Court oriented religious
accommodation doctrine in the direction most fraught with establishment dangers. Declaring that "[v]alues that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are
not thereby banished from the political process, '

2 38

Justice Scalia

invited federal and state officials to dole out whatever religious
exemptions might strike their political fancies, notwithstanding that
"leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in.

"239

b.

Permissive Accommodation After Smith

Smith has had the predictable effects of clearing most religious
accommodation cases from the Court's docket and ushering in a
bonanza of discretionary religious accommodations. 240 Congress
responded to Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA) ,241 which sought to reimpose the Sherbert strict
scrutiny standard for all mandatory accommodation claims. Although
the Court loudly struck down RFRA on federalism grounds in City of
Boerne v. Flores,242 it recently made clear in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal 2 43 what Boerne implied by omission-that

244
RFRA remains effective for claims against the federal government.
Neither Boerne nor 0 Centro considered any implications of the Establishment Clause for RFRA's broad mandate of discretionary

accommodations.

245

Although Smith would appear to have cleared the accommodation field for more focused consideration of Establishment Clause lim237

See id. at

238

Id. at 890.

239
240

Id.
See Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation as Legal Exemptions Grow,

886-87.

N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, § 1, at Al.
241 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000)), invalidatedin part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
242 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
243 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
244 Id. at 424. For a discussion of RFRA's constitutionality as applied to federal law

after Boerne, see Magarian, supra note 136, at 1917-61.
245 Justice Stevens, concurring in Boerne, would have struck down RFRA on its face
as a violation of the Establishment Clause. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens joined the unanimous 0 Centro opinion without writing
separately. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 422.
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its on discretionary accommodations, the Court has taken up few such
cases over the past fifteen years. In Cutter v. Wilkinson,2 46 the Justices
unanimously rejected an ambitious Establishment Clause argument
that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA),247 a micro-RFRA that requires strict scrutiny of religious
burdens on federal prisoners, was invalid on its face. 248

Echoing

Amos, Justice Ginsburg's opinion found that the Act merely "alleviates
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise." 24 9 The only post-Smith case in which the Court has struck down

a discretionary accommodation is Board of Education of KiryasJoel Village School Districtv. Grumet,250 which rejected New York's creation of a
special school district for members of the Satmar Hasidim. 25 1 Justice
Souter's majority opinion found that creating the special district
extended beyond noninterference with religion to "single[ ] out a
particular religious sect for special treatment," 252 thereby violating the
25 3
principle that "neutrality as among religions must be honored."
2
54
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's vigorous dissent in KiryasJoel, both
that case and Cutter produced unremarkable outcomes. The Court
255
generally disdains the sort of facial challenge brought in Cutter.
KiryasJoel represents the Court's clearest acknowledgement that favoritism toward even a minority religion can violate the Establishment
Clause, but the unusual accommodation in that case implicated a core
function of government more directly than the Sabbath relief of
Thornton or the tax exemption of Texas Monthly.
The only other recent decision in which the Court credited
nonestablishment interests in the context of a free exercise claim was
Locke v. Davey.25 6 In that case, a college student majoring in pastoral
ministry argued that the State of Washington's refusal to make devo246 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
247 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
248 See Cutter,544 U.S. at 725-26.
249 Id. at 720; see supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text. As in 0 Centro,
Justice Stevens wrote no separate opinion in Cutter, declining another opportunity to
press the Establishment Clause concern he voiced in his Boerne concurrence. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 711.
250 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
251 See id. at 706-09.
252 Id. at 706.
253 Id. at 707.
254 See id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (holding that, for a facial
challenge to succeed, "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the [challenged regulation] would be valid").
256 540 U.S. 712 (2004).

2007]

COLLIDING FIRST AMENDMENT

INTERESTS

tional theology students eligible for a state scholarship program constituted discrimination against religion in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause. 25 7 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
found that the student had not made the demanding showing
required to establish free exercise discrimination. 258 The Chief Jus-

tice split the Establishment Clause baby in an odd way. Veering into
dicta, the opinion declares that the Establishment Clause would not
259
have barred extending the scholarship funds to devotional study.
Then, invoking the "play in the joints" formulation of Walz, 2 6 0 the
Court credits Washington's explanation that it sought not to discriminate against religion but only to avoid violating the nonestablishment
requirement of the state constitution, which imposes a stronger bar
than the Federal Establishment Clause against funding religion. 2 6 1 In
vindicating Washington's position, the Court comes close to endorsing in principle the nonestablishment imperative to withhold state
funds from ministerial studies. 262 Despite its nuanced rhetoric, however, Locke reduces to a predictable extension of Smith deference,
rebuffing an effort to extend the zone of religious discrimination in
which the Court gives meaningful effect to the Free Exercise Clause
while reiterating the Court's narrow view of the Establishment
Clause. 263
Smith dramatically weakens the force of both- the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause in religious accommodation
cases. The Smith Court openly diminished the Free Exercise Clause to
a prohibition on deliberate discrimination against religion. Although
the Court barely mentioned the Establishment Clause and offered no
new guidance for adjudicating permissive accommodation disputes,
its enthusiastic channeling of accommodation claims into the political
process eviscerated the Establishment Clause as a check on permissive
accommodations. Smith averts the need to justify denying one or
257 See id.at 717-18.
258 See id. at 725.
259 See id. at 719.
260 See id. at 718 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). For a
more complete discussion of Walz, see supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
261 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 722-23.
262 See id. at 722 ("[W]e can think of few areas in which a State's antiestablishment
interests come more into play.").
263 Justice Scalia, dissenting in Locke, provides a rare critique of the Court's "play
in the joints" approach to conflicts between the two religion clauses, calling it "not so
much a legal principle as a refusal to apply any principle when faced with competing
constitutional directives." Id. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, however,
views the two clauses as perfectly coordinated to "demand neutrality," not as coming
into any sort of conflict. Id.
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another First Amendment interest in particular religious accommodation scenarios by categorically denying the First Amendment's salience for nearly all accommodation disputes. This strategy obviates
any danger of a First Amendment collision involving the Free Exercise
Clause and strongly decreases the likelihood that establishment concerns will pull the Court into substantive constitutional analysis of
religious accommodations.
c.

The Free Speech Clause vs. the Establishment Clause:
Religious Speakers' Claims on Public Resources

A distinct line of decisions involves a collision of First Amendment interests that crosses the median between expressive and religious interests. In most of these cases, public educational institutions
seek to deny otherwise generally available expressive resources to
religious groups or speakers, based on the government's asserted
interest in avoiding violations of the Establishment Clause. Widmar v.
Vincent 264 involved a university's denial of meeting space to a religious
student group. 265 In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
2 66
a school district refused to let a church group use school
District,
property after hours for a film showing. 26 7 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia268 dealt with a university's withholding of
student activity funds from a religious publication. 269 In Good News
Club v. Milford Central School,270 a school district once again denied
access to school property after hours for a religious function, this time
for meetings of a religious children's group. 27 1 In each case, the
Court ruled in favor of the religious group. 2 72 The cases have played
out over two decades, and the majority opinions employ somewhat
varied reasoning, but the decisions make a consistent set of core
points: school property made available for third parties' use is a limited public forum; 2 73 denying access specifically for religious speakers
264 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
265
266

See id. at 265-66.
508 U.S. 384 (1993).

267

See id. at 387-89.

268 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
269 See id. at 822-23.
270 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
271 See id. at 103.
272 Id. at 120; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395-97;
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
273 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106 (noting the parties' stipulation that the
school's opening of facilities for after-hours meeting had created a limited public
forum); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30 ("The necessities of confining a forum to the
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amounts to an impermissible viewpoint-based exclusion;274 and government in these circumstances has no valid concern that opening
the forum to religious expression would violate the Establishment
Clause. 275 The Court followed identical reasoning to a similar result
in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,276 which found that
the Free Speech Clause protected, and the Establishment Clause did
not restrict, the Ku Klux Klan's display of an unattended cross on state
capitol grounds open to a variety of expression. 277
The government's role in these religious speech disputes distinguishes them from expressive access cases. The public-private distinction has led the Court in public forum cases to find a limited First
Amendment access right to public property, even as it has rejected the
idea of an access right to private property. 278 The public-private distinction also limits the government to pleading its regulatory prerogatives, as opposed to constitutional rights, in countering the First
Amendment right of expressive access to public forums. What distinguishes these religious speech disputes from ordinary public forum
cases is that the government dons a constitutional cloak by invoking
its responsibility to respect the Establishment Clause. Thus, these
limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created mayjustify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics."); Lamb's Chapel, 508

U.S. at 391-93 (suggesting that school facilities might have been a public forum but
assuming arguendo that they were a nonpublic forum); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 n.5
("A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a
university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities.").
274 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107-10; Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 830-32; Lamb's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 (stating that the University "discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion").
275 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113-14 (holding that allowing a religious group
to meet on school property would present no danger of endorsement of religion);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-40 (holding that inclusion of a religious beneficiary in a
generally available funding scheme does not violate the Establishment Clause);
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395-96 (concluding that University's creation of a public
forum could not violate the Establishment Clause); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272-73
("[A]n open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices.").

276
277

515 U.S. 753 (1995).
See id. at 770. The majority portion ofJustice Scalia's opinion in Capitol Square

followed Widmar and Lamb's Chapel without much embellishment. See id. at 757-63.

The remainder of the opinion, which garnered only plurality support, sought to discredit posited distinctions between the educational institution cases and the distinctive facts of Capitol Square. See id. at 763-70 (plurality opinion).
278 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (distinguishing expressive access and
public forum disputes).
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cases present a distinctive instance of colliding First Amendment
interests. The religious speaker plaintiffs literally seek expressive
access, but the public forum doctrine grants their interests a degree of
constitutional legitimacy that expressive access claims against private
defendants, as well as post-Smith free exercise accommodation claims,
lack. The government defendants, meanwhile, invoke the Establishment Clause to vindicate the people's First Amendment interest in
nonestablishment.
The manifest necessity in the religious speech cases of analyzing
the competing free speech and nonestablishment claims suggests that
here, at last, the Justices must squarely confront a collision of First
Amendment interests. The decisions' reasoning, however, finds a
path to denial. The notoriously elastic public forum doctrine allows
the Court to treat these particular speakers' interests not merely as
constitutionally legitimate but rather as something akin to the robust
interest in expressive autonomy. The decisions portray the plaintiffs
as seeking not special treatment but merely equal treatment, 279 and
they portray the government not merely as foreclosing opportunities
but as censoring ideas. 28 0 On the other hand, the decisions employ
the anemic Establishment Clause rhetoric of successful religious
accommodation cases such as Sherbert and Walz, ubiquitous after the
Smith Court's license for discretionary accommodations. Especially in
the more recent religious speech decisions, the majority emphasizes
that the Free Speech Clause compels the government to give religious
entities whatever it gives otherwise comparable secular entities, characterizing governmental nonsupport of religious speech based on
Establishment Clause concerns as a "heckler's veto." 28 1 The principle

that animates a more forceful account of the Establishment Clausethat governmental support of religion creates constitutionally cognizable hazards-has faded out of the picture entirely.
The Court in the religious speech cases does not substantively
assess the relative merits of the asserted free speech and nonestablishment interests. Rather, it does exactly what it did in failed expressive
access cases such as Lloyd Cop. and Miami Herald, the successful
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 ("The University has opened its facilities for
279 See, e.g.,
use by student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because
of the content of their speech.").
280 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (stating that a school district denied
access for religious film showings "solely because the series dealt with the subject from
a religious standpoint").
281 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (stating that
"[w]e decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler's veto").
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mandatory accommodation cases Sherbert and Yoder, and the successful challenges to permissive accommodations in Thornton and Texas
Monthly--wholly embracing one competing First Amendment interest
while categorically denying the existence or salience of another. The
religious speech decisions do not conclude that expressive autonomy
interests, in the circumstances, outweigh nonestablishment interests.
Rather, they declare that government officials have blatantly violated
expressive freedom and senselessly invoked the Establishment Clause
where it has no proper application. These decisions reaffirm the
Court's general solicitude for expressive autonomy and general lack
of anxiety that government establishes religion by assisting religious
entities. What they do not do, any more than the expressive access or
religious accommodation decisions, is tell us anything about how the
Court would decide a case in which it acknowledged the presence of
two colliding First Amendment interests.
II.

RESOLVING FIRST AMENDMENT COLLISIONS UNDER
PARTICIPIATION-ENHANCING

REVIEW

In the three seemingly disparate contexts of expressive access,
religious accommodation, and religious speech decisions, the
Supreme Court resorts to some combination of two techniquesdenial of one of the competing interests and deference to elected
decisionmakers-in order to avoid substantive resolution of First
Amendment collisions. The striking consistency in the Court's
approach indicates that these three categories of First Amendment
collisions share some important, fundamental attributes. Every First
Amendment dispute, whether focused on speech, religion, or both,
involves-at least in theory-fundamental issues of individual conscience. The importance of those conscientious issues for shaping
individuals' participation in society means that every First Amendment dispute also affects the process of collective self-government that
defines our democratic system. Recognizing the stakes of First
Amendment disputes for democratic government helps to explain the
Court's use of denial and deference to avoid substantive resolution of
First Amendment collisions. Where interests charged with democratic
significance come into direct conflict, assertive judicial review may
appear to encroach on the domain of democratic policymaking.
The democratic salience of First Amendment collisions, however,
underscores the problem with the Court's approach. The First
Amendment contributes substantially to the constitutional structure
of our democracy, and any collision between structural elements creates the most pressing need for authoritative constitutional resolution.
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Thus, the many important cases in which First Amendment interests
collide should compel the Court to extricate itself from the tangled
web of denial and deference and to embrace a mode of adjudication
that allows the Justices to construe and enforce the First Amendment's commands. This Part diagnoses the failings of the Court's
approach and proposes an alternative way to adjudicate First Amendment collisions, based on a commitment to advancing participatory
democracy. Proceeding from John Hart Ely's elaboration of representation-reinforcing review-the most thorough justification for assertive judicial enforcement of constitutional rights as an essential
component of our democratic system-I call the proposed alternative
participation-enhancing review.
The first half of this Part critically analyzes why the Court has
consistently met First Amendment collisions with the techniques of
denial and deference that Part I describes. The dominant theme in
the expressive access, religious accommodation, and religious speech
decisions alike is the need for the government to treat ideas and
speakers, and faiths and believers, in a neutral manner. By using
denial and deference to enforce government neutrality, the Court
ultimately seeks to maintain neutrality in its own decisions. Denying
the existence of First Amendment collisions when possible, and deferring to elected decisionmakers when necessary, avoids visible resort to
the substantive values necessary for choosing one First Amendment
interest over another and thus precludes usurping democratically
elected officials' policymaking authority. The Court's reliance on
denial and deference, however, conceals normatively charged baselines: in the speech cases, a formalistic conception of the public-private distinction and a rarefied ideal of autonomy; in the religion cases,
a disregard for the interests of minority religious believers and a
strong tolerance for government favoritism toward religious interests.
The Court's approach to these cases creates a false impression of neutrality in the name of democratic government, but the Court disserves
our democratic system by failing to confront and apply the First
Amendment principles that make that system work.
A better approach to these important cases would forthrightly
acknowledge the presence of First Amendment collisions and assess
them under an analytic method firmly grounded in democratic principles. The second half of this Part contends that the Court can choose
between colliding First Amendment values, and justify its choices, by
relying on a substantive conception of democratic participation.
Beginning from the familiar theory of representation-reinforcing
review, I explain how a focus on the informative and inclusive qualities of democratic participation provides a basis for the Court to make
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substantive constitutional judgments about which of two colliding
First Amendment interests should prevail in any given case. The participation-enhancing review that I propose would lead the Court to
consider whether granting a putative speaker access to expressive
property would enhance or diminish the quality of public debate, and
whether exempting a religious believer from a legal obligation would
advance or retard the vitality of democratic discourse. In practice,
these inquiries would favor dissenting and minority perspectives,
whatever their substantive viewpoints, in speech and religion. If the
Court justified its choices between First Amendment interests in terms
of facilitating and advancing people's capacity to participate meaningfully in democratic processes, most people, most of the time, would
consider the Court's grounds for decision democratically legitimate,
and the Court would satisfy its obligation to implement the First
Amendment in cases that raise profound constitutional issues about
speech and religion.
A.

Neutrality as the Supreme Court's Conceptual Basis for Refusing
to Confront First Amendment Conflicts

In every sort of speech and religion dispute that brings First
Amendment interests into collision, the Supreme Court forestalls substantive resolution by purporting to make the less momentous inquiry
of whether the relevant governmental decisionmaker has behaved
neutrally toward ideas and speakers, or between faiths and believers.
Thus, for example, the gay-lesbian would-be parade marchers in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. 282 suf-

fered no violation of expressive freedom because the government did
not restrict the content of their speech; 28 3 the Native American
church members in Employment Division v. Smith 28 4 suffered no violation of free exercise because the government treated them the same
as everyone else; 285 the Christian student group in Rosenberger v. Rector

& Visitors of University of Virginia286 did suffer a violation of expressive
freedom because the state university treated the group differently
than it treated similar organizations. 28 7 The surface of virtually every
First Amendment collision case strongly conveys the message that the
282
283
284
285
286
287

515 U.S. 557 (1995); see supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580-81.
494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
515 U.S. 819 (1995); see supra note 268 and accompanying text.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
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Court need only determine whether or not the government has
treated opposing parties and interests neutrally.
Neutrality, of course, is a prominent trope in both free speech
and religious freedom doctrine. The central question in the Court's
free speech analysis is whether a challenged regulation is neutral as to
the content of speech. 288 Neutrality is one of two ever-contending
models-separation is its opposite number-for the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 289 while Free Exercise Clause doctrine has
come to focus almost completely on neutral treatment of religious
beliefs and believers. 290 Numerous commentators have emphasized
how the Court's focus on neutrality has hampered its First Amendment decisions on free speech 291 and religion.2 92 Even so, an emphasis on neutrality seems intuitively desirable in cases of colliding First
288 See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (holding that regulating
speech "in terms of subject matter ... is never permitted").
289 Compare, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding that the
Establishment Clause "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers"), with Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)
(holding that the "first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause]
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion"). See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal,Substantive, and
DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) (clarifying the
meaning of "neutrality" as it relates to religious liberty).
290 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 547 (1993) (striking down a local animal cruelty ordinance whose prohibitions
specifically targeted a religious group).
291 Recent critiques of neutrality as a central feature of free speech doctrine
include Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court'sApplication, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 53-64 (2000) (criticizing several applications of the content neutrality principle); John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1169-70 (2005) (arguing that the Court should
subordinate the content neutrality principle to the goal of promoting public debate);
Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First
Amendment Jurisprudence,10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 647, 705-06 (2002) (arguing that
the content neutrality principle should not bar limitations on speech that violates the

rights of others).
292 Recent critiques of neutrality as a central feature of Establishment Clause doctrine include Steven K. Green, Of (Un)EqualJurisprudentialPedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1136-37 (2002)
(arguing that the Court should emphasize separation and limit neutrality to an
adjunct role); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad
Principles,Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 492 (2004) (criticizing the Court's increasing reliance on neutrality in Establishment Clause cases and
claiming that neutrality does not exist); Keith Werhan, Navigating the New Neutrality:
School Vouchers, the Pledge, and the Limits of a PurposiveEstablishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 603, 603-04 (2003) (criticizing the Court's oscillation between "substantive" and
"purposive" neutrality).
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Amendment interests, because those cases present the Court with a
conflict between constitutional principles as to which any decisive resolution might appear undesirably biased.
The Court in First Amendment collision cases therefore seeks to
ensure governmental neutrality by employing techniques that it holds
out as neutral principles of decision: denial and deference. 29 3 In each
case of a First Amendment collision, however, reliance on those techniques submerges one or both of two deeply rooted First Amendment
interests-autonomy or access, free exercise or nonestablishment. As
my discussion will demonstrate, the Court's approach fails on two
levels. The Justices' use of denial and deference undermines their
commitment to neutrality in resolving First Amendment collisions,
and that commitment to neutrality betrays their responsibility to interpret and enforce the First Amendment.
1.

Neutrality in Expressive Access Cases

The Court's primary approach to collisions between expressive
autonomy and expressive access interests is to deny that the First
Amendment provides any basis for expressive access claims. The
Court builds this denial on two primary rhetorical supports: a rigid
account of the public-private distinction and a singular focus on maintaining expressive autonomy to the exclusion of any other expressive
interest. The Court places these two elements squarely in the foreground of decisions that deny the existence of expressive access interests. What the two elements share is their strong resonance with a
narrative of neutrality-the idea that a principled court is simply
instructing the government to treat different speakers and viewpoints
in an unbiased manner. The Court presents both its account of the
public-private distinction and its fixation on expressive autonomy as if
they are objectively necessary ingredients of a neutral First Amendment analysis. In fact, both positions reflect strong and consequential
normative choices. Likewise, where legislative provisions for expressive access cause the Court to retreat into deference, its seemingly
neutral respect for legislative discretion serves to avert closer scrutiny
of its denial of a constitutional access interest.
The Court prominently invokes the distinction between private
constitutional rights and public constitutional obligations as a basis
for denying that the First Amendment supports any interest in access
293

The classic argument for the value of neutral decisional principles is Herbert

Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 H v. L. REv. 1 (1959).
See also ROBERT H. BoRK., THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-53 (1990) (advocating judi-

cial reliance on neutral principles).
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to the means of expression. In CBS, Inc. v. DemocraticNational Committee, 294 a plurality of the Court dismissed political activists' demand to
buy advertising on national broadcast networks as an improper effort
29 5
to impose constitutional constraints on private editorial judgment.
The Court in Hurley treated a gay organization's plea for access to a
prominent community event as an assertion of legislative antidiscrimination policy against the private parade organizers' choice of
which perspectives to present. 29 6 Invoking the public-private distinction to delegitimize expressive access claims allows the Court, on the
surface, to avoid making substantive judgments about the relative values of competing speakers and ideas. Public authorities' obligation to
respect private speakers' prerogatives makes for a comfortingly linear
and value-neutral narrative. That narrative, however, ignores the government's essential role in creating and sustaining private prerogatives, 29 7 and it stacks the rhetorical deck by holding out a formal
distinction in status as a proxy for actual differences in power. The
incongruous result is a legal regime that falls over itself to protect an
enormous, publicly licensed broadcasting corporation and the publicly sanctioned organizers of a dominant ethnic group's most
renowned urban spectacle from political dissidents and sexual pariahs. The Court's rigid application of the public-private distinction to
expressive access disputes goes far beyond the laudable aim of protecting individuals' expressive integrity to shield powerful institutions'
expressive resources against distributional challenges. The substan298
tive effect is to favor established wisdom over unruly dissent.
The Court's other basis for denying a First Amendment interest
in expressive access is its overriding emphasis on autonomy as a free
speech value. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 29 9 the Court
treated a media corporation's editorial discretion as an especially
potent instance of expressive autonomy and made clear that the
autonomy interest left no room in the First Amendment for access
294 412 U.S. 94 (1973); see supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
295 See CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 132.
296 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
572-75 (1995); supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
297 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 36-37 (explaining the essential role of law
in distributing opportunities for expression).
298 1 develop this critique of the public-private distinction more thoroughly, and
apply it in the particular context of nongovernmental censorship of wartime dissent,
in Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-PrivateDistinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime PoliticalDebate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 101, 135-51
(2004).
299 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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interests. 300 In Paciflic Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,30 1
the Court treated the public's interest in information about utility
issues as a mere outgrowth of the utility's interest in controlling the
content of its billing envelopes, dismissing political dissenters' efforts
to add information to the envelopes as an attempt to impose a species
of censorship. 30 2 Likewise, Buckley v. Valeo30 3 rejected controls on
political expenditures as improper constraints on the autonomy of
well-financed speakers. 30 4 The Court's fixation on autonomy, like its
reliance on the public-private distinction, creates an image of governmental and judicial neutrality. What, these decisions ask, could be
more neutral than letting speakers speak, and what could be more
improperly biased than forcing them to bear the din of opposing
speakers? In the Court's portrayal, expressive autonomy facilitates valuable expression by those who have earned the right to participate in
public debate, while constitutional claims for access seek to poach
legitimate speakers' expressive autonomy. Once again, however, this
picture of neutrality disguises a more complicated, normatively
charged choice. 30 5 Single-minded emphasis on autonomy favors the
expressive haves over the have-nots. 3 0 6 No one who already possesses
expressive resources needs to claim an interest in access to those
resources, and no one who lacks expressive resources has any basis for
claiming an interest in expressive autonomy. Even more problematic
for First Amendment doctrine, a bias toward established speakers
tends to yield a bias toward established viewpoints.
In relying on the public-private distinction and reifying the value
of expressive autonomy, the Justices might be acting upon substantively defensible judgments. Perhaps they believe a formalist version
of the public-private distinction will usually assign rights and impose
300 See Miami Herald,418 U.S. at 258. The Court in a subsequent case went so far
as to invoke the primacy of editorial autonomy in spite of the public-private distinction, using a particularly narrow conception of the public forum doctrine to protect a
public broadcaster from the obligation to articulate objective standards for excluding
a minor-party political candidate from a televised electoral debate. See Ark. Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998).
301 475 U.S. 1 (1986); see supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
302 See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 13-15, 20-21.
303 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); see supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
304 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52-53, 143.
305 The Court itself has at times declared that expressive freedom means more
than just expressive autonomy. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (emphasizing "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
306 See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRoNY OF FREE SPEECH 9-18 (1996) (discussing the
tension between the First Amendment values of liberty and equality).
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obligations in a manner that comports with the best understanding of
constitutional expressive freedom. 30 7 Perhaps their emphasis on
expressive autonomy to the total exclusion of expressive access reflects
a theory of rights that takes access interests into account and finds
them philosophically wanting.30 8 Such bases for the Court's positions
would at least enable a normative justification for denying the existence of a First Amendment interest in expressive access. Unfortunately, the Court has made no substantial effort to defend its
conception of the public-private distinction or its exclusive embrace of
expressive autonomy, on those or any other grounds. Instead, the
Court's decisions simply invoke these normative preferences as if they
were organic, unassailable components of a substantively neutral free
speech doctrine. That sleight of hand obscures the access decisions'
inherent slant toward status quo distributions of expressive opportunities. As such, the Court's reliance on the public-private distinction
and preoccupation with expressive autonomy foment doctrinal confusion and even create the capacity for engineering preferred outcomes
under cover of purportedly neutral principles.
Discretionary government regulations to expand expressive
access, as seen in such cases as PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins30 9
and CBS, Inc. v. FCC,3 10 put the Court in a difficult position. If the
Justices asserted expressive autonomy as a constitutional value to
trump regulatory access initiatives, they would have to provide some
substantive resolution of the conflict between the competing interests.
They could not simply ignore the expressive access interest, because
the government's regulatory initiative imbues the interest with salience. Conversely, the Court's denial of First Amendment expressive
access interests precludes it from validating the government's action
on constitutional grounds. The path of least resistance, charted in the
Court's decisions, is to defer the determination whether and to what
extent access interests may compromise autonomy interests to legisla307

Exemplars of this sort of argument include Julian N. Eule &Jonathan D. Varat,

TransportingFirst Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a
Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1554-64- (1998); Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse,64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1125-28
(1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, ResurrectingFree Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 971,979-82

(1995). For a critical response, see Magarian, supra note 298, at 135-50.
308 Exemplars of this sort of argument include MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY

TALKS

147-95 (2001); Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,95
MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1534-38 (1997); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination,Distribution

and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 446-51 (1995).

For a critical response, see

Magarian, supra note 5, at 1393-99.
309
310

447 U.S. 74 (1980); see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
453 U.S. 367 (1981); see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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tive discretion, effectively pretending the constitutional problem does
not exist. The Court attempts to justify its deference to legislative
access initiatives through narrow, context-specific diminutions of
expressive autonomy interests-for example, the interest in excluding
certain speakers from shopping areas open to the public or the interest in discriminating against political candidates in the sale of advertising. Unfortunately, the Court elsewhere recognizes precisely those
interests as exemplars of its ordinary, robust account of expressive
autonomy. 3 '' Thus, the Court's deference, designed to reinforce an
image of principled neutrality, underscores the normative bias inherent in the Court's denial of expressive access interests.
2.

Neutrality in Religious Accommodation Cases

In the religious accommodation context, as in the expressive
access context, the Supreme Court defines the government's obligation in terms of neutrality. The Court employs neutrality rhetoric
much more directly in the accommodation cases, routinely claiming
that its outcomes preserve neutral treatment of beliefs and believers. 3 12 The path to the Court's own purportedly neutral approach
toward accommodation claims has taken more complicated turns
than in the speech setting. Earlier religious accommodation decisions
variously invoked the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause as servants of neutrality, always denying or ignoring the opposite, competing First Amendment interest. Then, in a dual progression that culminated in Employment Division v. Smith,313 the Court
settled on deference to elected officials as its mechanism for project311 Compare PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88 (1980) (holding that state constitutional provisions, which permit individuals to exercise free speech on the property of a privately
owned shopping center to which the public is invited, did not violate the shopping
center owner's First Amendment rights), with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
567 (1972) ("It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require
[expressive property owners] to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist."); compare
also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 396-97 (1981) (holding that the Communications
Act of 1934, in authorizing the FCC to revoke broadcasters' licenses for willful or
repeated failure to allow legally qualified candidates for federal elective office a special right of access to broadcasting, on an individual basis, is not a violation of broadcasters' First Amendment rights), with CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 116-21 (1973) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing the importance of broadcasters'
editorial autonomy in rejecting political advertisers' First Amendment challenge to
broadcaster's refusal to sell them advertising time). For further discussion of these
cases, see supra notes 14-28, 57-62, 68-71 and accompanying text.
312 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 138-49.
313 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
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ing neutrality. 3 14 The textual grounding of both free exercise and
nonestablishment interests animates the Court's choice of deference
over denial in the religion setting, and deference sends a bold, simple
message ofjudicial neutrality. As in the expressive access setting, however, the Court's failure to resolve First Amendment collisions yields
normatively biased consequences, undermining the interests of
minority religious believers while eroding restraints against government favoritism toward religion generally.
The ubiquity of neutrality rhetoric in religious accommodation
cases belies the conceptual difficulty of figuring out what neutrality
means when a religious believer tells a court that only treating her
differently from nonbelievers can vindicate her constitutional rights.
In the series of mandatory accommodation cases that began with Sherbert v. Verner 3 15 the Court initially posited a strong reading of the Free
Exercise Clause as a necessary element of government neutrality
toward religion. 316 Without mandatory accommodations, the Court
reasoned in the Sherbert line of unemployment benefits cases 3 17 and in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 18 religious believers suffer a special burden
because their constitutionally guaranteed right to worship puts them
at odds with the law in a distinctive way. As the Court advanced its
view of free exercise neutrality, it necessarily ignored the question of
whether mandatory accommodations might raise establishment concerns and thus violate a different sense of neutrality. Over time, however, the Sherbert view of neutrality eroded to nothingness. In a range
of decisions that rejected mandatory accommodation claims, 3 19 the
Court directly retreated from the view that neutrality required a
proactive view of the Free Exercise Clause. In permissive accommodation cases the Court at most ignored the Free Exercise Clause; at
worst, in the decisions that struck down permissive accommodations,
the Court aggressively denied the salience of free exercise considerations.3 20 Taken together, the post-Sherbert accommodation cases trace
a trajectory from a confident view that the Free Exercise Clause serves
neutrality to a deep sense of skepticism whether constitutionally mandated legal exemptions can ever comport with a proper view of
neutrality.
314
315
316
317
318

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.

319

406 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.

320

See supra notes 208-21 and accompanying text.
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In a counterintuitive parallel, the Court's approach to the seemingly antithetical Establishment Clause dimension of the religious
accommodation cases displays the same trajectory from assertiveness
to skepticism. The decisions that struck down permissive accommodations under a strong reading of the Establishment Clause held out a
strong nonestablishment principle as the helpmate of neutrality as
confidently as the Sherbert line had assigned the same value to a strong
free exercise principle. These decisions maintained that relieving certain religious believers of legal burdens that everyone else must bear
flouts government's obligation to treat believers of all faiths, and perhaps even nonbelievers, the same. Mirroring the strong free exercise
decisions' disdain for the Establishment Clause, the Court's assertions
of a strong Establishment Clause constraint on permissive accommodations necessarily denied or disregarded the notion of a constitutionally salient free exercise interest. More commonly, however, the
Court in religious accommodation cases came to view the Establishment Clause as an impediment rather than an aid to neutrality. The
Court rejected Establishment Clause arguments when it upheld permissive accommodations in the name of neutrality in Walz v. Tax Commission 2 1 and Corporation of the PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos. 322 Over a wide range of mandatory

accommodation decisions, the Court treated the Establishment
Clause as utterly irrelevant. The Sherbert line of successful mandatory
accommodation cases flatly denied any salience of the Establishment
Clause; more damningly, even as the Court in the 1980s found numerous reasons to reject mandatory accommodation claims, it steadfastly
refused to find any role for the Establishment Clause.3 23 As with the
Free Exercise Clause, the Court's quest for neutrality in religious
3 24
accommodation cases left the Establishment Clause behind.
321

397 U.S. 664 (1970); see supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.

322

483 U.S. 327 (1987); see supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.

323 See supra Part I.B.1.
324 The Court's progression on the Establishment Clause side of the religious
accommodation cases does not follow the neat chronology found on the Free Exercise Clause side. The idea of neutrality, however, has played a prominent role in a
much broader set of Establishment Clause cases than merely religious accommodation cases, and the Court over the past three decades has moved inexorably toward
the view that greater allowance for government support of religion serves neutrality
under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
654 (2002) (upholding a publicly financed school voucher program under the principle of government neutrality toward religion). Read against that background, the
Court's treatment of nonestablishment interests in the religious accommodation cases
tracks its treatment of free exercise interests in moving from assertiveness to deference in the name of neutrality.
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In both their free exercise and nonestablishment dimensions, the
Court's religious accommodation decisions before 1990 oscillated
wildly in their understandings of what governmental neutrality toward
religion required. 325 In addition, the Court's frequent denial of
either free exercise or nonestablishment interests ran aground on the
plain language of the First Amendment. Responding to these
problems, Smith abandoned all efforts to secure neutrality by asserting
one First Amendment principle while denying the other, opting
instead for total deference to legislative discretion in all but the most
extreme accommodation scenarios. 326 Smith told elected officials that
the Religion Clauses placed few, if any, barriers in the way of handling
appeals for accommodations in whatever way any political majority
found desirable. 32 7 This approach replaced the earlier decisions' tangled pathways toward an elusive ideal of governmental neutrality with
a meta-narrative of judicial neutrality. 328 Smith allows the Court to
claim immunity both from the danger that particular claimants' free
exercise appeals will lead it to give religious believers benefits that
nonbelievers might also desire and deserve and from the danger that
aggressive appeals to nonestablishment principles will cause it to
undermine religious liberty by taking a cramped view of permissible
accommodations. Smith guarantees neutral outcomes by making neutrality mean whatever elected officials decide it means.
Combining a Free Exercise Clause that does nothing to guarantee religious exemptions with an Establishment Clause that does
almost nothing to prevent them has produced a legal regime that
strongly favors the interests of politically powerful religious institutions. Since 1989, Congress alone has enacted more than 200 religious exemptions, covering topics as diverse as land use restrictions,
employment discrimination, and tax liability, while federal agencies
and state legislatures have enacted countless others. 3 29 Smith thus has
provided an enormous windfall for religious entities that own substantial property, engage in significant commercial activity, and face major
tax liability-primarily large, institutional Christian churches. 330 This
325
326

See supra Part I.B.1-2.
See supra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.

327 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
328 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (asserting that the political disadvantaging of minority religions under a discretionary accommodation regime "must be preferred to a
system . . . in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs").
329 See Henriques, supra note 240.
330 See generally id. (providing examples of benefits churches experience with
exemptions).
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state of affairs presents two constitutional problems. First, it reflects
the political majority's propensity to privilege religious beliefs over
33
functionally equivalent nonreligious commitments of conscience. '
Second, in Stephen Carter's apt summary, "what we are bold to call
neutrality means in practice that big religions win and small religions
lose."3

32

Marginal religious believers-splinter or fledgling churches,

groups whose belief systems resist institutional organization, and idiosyncratic believers with no church affiliation-gain little or no benefit
from the institutionally focused accommodations that have followed
Smith. Religious outliers have found episodic success in compromis33 3
ing with the political majority to secure particular accommodations,
and all believers can avail themselves of general statutory exemptions
3 4
such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 3
Even general exemptions, however, primarily manifest the perspectives and influence of the Christian majority,3 3 5 and in general minority believers benefit only modestly from a majoritarian system that
predictably favors the majority's interests. 3 36 The Court prior to Smith
331 See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1007, 1015-24 (2001) (arguing that legislatures should adopt an "equal
liberty approach," extending permissive accommodations to "similarly situated nonreligious claimants" because otherwise religious believers are given privilege over
their nonreligious counterparts); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1291-97 (1994) (arguing for application of an "equal regard" prin-

ciple to religious and secular claims of conscience).
332 Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if Religion Matters: A Tribute toJustice Brennan, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1059, 1063 (1999).
333 SeeJesse H. Choper, Comments on Stephen Carter's Lecture, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1087,
1089-90 (1999) (discussing instances of specific accommodations for minority
religions).
334 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Dean Choper holds out the passage of RFRA as the
strongest evidence of the Smith neutrality regime's benefits for minority religions. See
Choper, supra note 333, at 1090. RFRA and its state equivalents, however, merely
demonstrate formal legislative nondiscrimination against minority religions in a general scheme that primarily benefits Christian churches. Moreover, the fact that RFRA
statutes operate through a judicial mechanism-requiring heightened scrutiny of
accommodation claims-underscores legislators' inattention to religious believers'
specific needs.
335 See Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for
Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 499, 507-16 (1998) (discussing differences
between Christianity and Judaism that make religious accommodation more salient to
Christians).
336 See McConnell, supra note 234, at 1130-36 (criticizing the majoritarian bias of
Smith); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195,
216 (1992) (contending that Smith exchanges judicial recourse more useful to minori-
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certainly failed to resolve these problems of favoritism, but the mass of
elected officials whom Smith empowered have made no effort to
address them.
As in the expressive access context, the Court's deconstitutionalization of religious accommodation might conceivably reflect a considered normative judgment. Thoughtful commentators have argued
that, on a proper understanding, the Establishment Clause does nothing more in the religious accommodation setting than buttress the
Free Exercise Clause mandate that government stay out of religious
believers' way.3 37 However, even if we accept that argument's norma-

tive orientation and look past its incompatibility with any notion of
constitutional evolution, the Court has never embraced it. Indeed,
the Smith Court provided no account at all of how and why the Establishment Clause does or does not impact accommodation cases. On
the free exercise side, the Court has posited a substantive distinction
between discrimination against religion and mere nonaccommodation. 3 3s That distinction, however, works only from the perspective of
the government. Legal burdens on free exercise fall just as heavily on
the burdened believer whether they result from discriminatory animus or administrative convenience. Thus, the distinction requires a
normative defense of the Court's choice of perspective, and all Smith
offers is a broadly stated alarm about anarchy and a critique of past
decisions' assertedly incurable practical failings. Once again, the
Court treats a contestable doctrinal choice with strong normative consequences as if it emerged organically and neutrally from the
Constitution.
3.

Neutrality in Religious Speech Cases

The Court's account of neutrality in the religious speech cases
hybridizes its understandings of how the two First Amendment interests that collide in those cases-expressive autonomy and the nonestablishment principle-operate in their respective native settings of
expressive access and religious accommodation disputes. The expressive access cases declare that the Court considers expressive autonomy
sufficiently central to free speech protection that the First Amendties than to majorities for legislative recourse more accessible to majorities than to
minorities).
337 See Laycock, supra note 289, at 1001-06 (arguing for substantive neutrality,
under which the government must minimize both encouragement and discouragement of religion); McConnell, supra note 135, at 690 (characterizing both the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause as designed to protect religious
freedom).
338 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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ment has no room for any right of expressive access.3- 39 The religious
accommodation cases minimize the importance of establishment concerns, broadly licensing substantial government support for religious
institutions. 340 Given those positions, the Court in the religious
speech cases inevitably portrays the primacy of religious speakers'
expressive autonomy over the government's Establishment Clause
concerns as definitive of neutral outcomes. As Justice Kennedy
declared in Rosenberger,34 1 "the guarantee of neutrality is respected,
not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and
evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies
and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse." 342
The distinctive factual settings of the religious speech cases preclude the sort of broad conclusion I have reached in the expressive
access and religious accommodation settings about the normative
consequences of the Court's view of neutrality. Religious groups-all
of them Christian-prevailed in each case, 3 4 3 but those consistent outcomes might simply follow from the consistency of the cases' fact patterns. The Court's view of neutrality in the religious speech cases,
however, reflects a decision against an alternative course of action.
The Justices could have followed their approach from the expressive
access setting by deferring to legislative discretion where the government decided to subordinate expressive autonomy to a competing
First Amendment interest.3

44

That approach would have fit more

comfortably in the religious speech cases, where the government
invoked an interest with undeniable constitutional salience, than in
the expressive access cases, where the Court deferred to the government's solicitude for an expressive access interest whose First Amendment pedigree the Court itself had flatly denied. 345 That the religious
speech cases nonetheless opt for denial over deference at least raises
the possibility that here, as in the other First Amendment collision
settings, the Court's projection of neutrality obscures a normative
bias: in this context, a preference for enhancing religious speakers'
prominence and influence in public discourse.

339 See supra notes 299-306 and accompanying text.
340 See supra notes 321-24 and accompanying text.
341 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see supra note 268 and accompanying text.
342 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995);
supra note 273 and accompanying text.
343 See supra Part I.B.3.c.
344

See supra Part I.A.

345

See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
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The Troubling Allure of Neutrality

The Court in First Amendment collision cases purports to apply
neutral principles of decision, but the results it reaches consistently
advance particular normative values. In expressive access cases, the
Court's persistent denial of any First Amendment grounding for
access interests depends on a rigid account of the public-private distinction and a single-minded focus on individual autonomy. The
resulting jurisprudence safeguards the expressive prerogatives of
wealthy and powerful speakers while disregarding the interests of
underfunded and dissident speakers. 346 In religious accommodation
cases, the extreme deference of Smith throws aside both the free exercise interests of believers in religions unfamiliar or distasteful to the
majority and the nonestablishment interests of anyone troubled by
exempting religious believers from generally applicable legal obligations. The resulting state of affairs allows political majorities to favor
and disfavor religious practices at will. 34 7 In religious speech cases,

the Court combines its extreme solicitude for expressive autonomy
with its view that the Establishment Clause places little or no constraint on religious claims to public resources. The apparent consequence is a stronger platform for religious speakers in public
debate.

348

Whatever the subjective appeal or offense of the normative slants
in the Court's decisions, they belie its commitment to deciding cases
in a neutral manner. If the Justices want us to believe that a neutral
jurisprudence always favors established speakers and majoritarian
religious institutions, they must at least defend their analyses in a way
that reconciles those consistent results with some account of neutrality. Not one of the First Amendment collision cases, however, offers
any such defense. That deficit of theory betrays the ultimate problem
at the heart of the Court's approach. Even if the aspiration toward
neutrality generated results that did not correspond with any normative preference, it would still drag the First Amendment down a blind
alley. Neutrality means nothing without a baseline, but the presence
of any baseline countermands neutrality. 349 Neutrality thus describes
an essentially futile goal for resolving constitutional conflicts.
346
347
348

See supra notes 294-311 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 312-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 339-45 and accompanying text.

349 See Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in ConstitutionalLaw (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5-13 (1992) (criticizing the
prevailing idea of neutrality in constitutional law as dependent on prepolitical distributions of resources that reflect normative biases); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the
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The Court's fixation on neutrality in the face of First Amendment
collisions appears rooted in an excessive concern with judicial
restraintY5° That concern reflects our legal culture's ongoing obsession with the countermajoritarian difficulty-the supposed incongruity of unelected judges overriding elected officials' policy
choices. 35 ' By pursuing a neutral jurisprudence, the Court seeks to
assuage the concern that its power to hold legislative policy judgments
unconstitutional will usurp democratic authority. 3 52 That concern
does not usually deter the Court from vigorous enforcement of the
First Amendment in straightforward cases of government censorship,
discrimination against religion, or patronage of religion. 3 53 Unlike
those scenarios, however, First Amendment collisions pit constitutional interests against one another, denying the Court the rhetorical
clarity of a constitutional trump. 354 The Court responds to this difficulty by employing denial and deference to maintain a posture of
restraint. Denial obviates the need to choose between constitutional
Rules Laid Down: A Critiqueof Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REv. 781,

804-24 (1983) (arguing that legal principles cannot be neutral because they necessarily reflect social practices).
350 The Seventh Circuit, in rejecting an unsuccessful patronage job seeker's challenge to a state party official's backing of a rival job candidate, has stated this concern
explicitly:
[W]e do not believe . . . that it is for us to establish a hierarchy of First
Amendment rights by granting one First Amendment remedy that denigrates another First Amendment right. The machinery of the courts may
not be invoked to protect one First Amendment right at the expense of the
other.
Tarpley v. Keistler, 188 F.3d 788, 796 n.7 (7th Cir. 1999).
351 See Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 334 (1998) (calling the countermajoritarian difficulty "the central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship").
The classic articulation of the countermajoritarian difficulty is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
352 Justice Frankfurter, in explaining his vote to affirm convictions for teaching
Communist doctrine, addressed this concern directly:
Free-speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are not legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province. How best to reconcile
competing interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they
strike is a judgment not to be displaced by ours, but to be respected unless
outside the pale of fair judgment.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
353 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 524 (1992).
354 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 154
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (setting forth the equal concern theory of why certain
rights should trump contrary political decisions).
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values by leaving only one constitutional value extant or salient to the
case. Although the Court's determination that the First Amendment
contains no right to expressive access manifests a highly subjective
constitutional judgment, the rhetoric of denial allows the Court to
present that judgment as a neutral insight that the right simply does
not exist. Deference directly subordinates the Court's decisional
authority to the elected branches' discretion, although the Court's
decisions about when to defer may substantially channel the effects of
3 55
that discretion.
Even aside from any normative bias it might obscure, the problem with the Court's refusal to confront First Amendment collisions is
that it marginalizes the First Amendment as a check on majoritarian
caprice and a guarantor of robust democratic discourse. Concerns
about judicial subjectivity should not preclude substantive judicial
enforcement of the First Amendment. Neutrality should not crowd
out democratic dynamism. To the extent that First Amendment collisions require the Court to make value judgments, it must root its judgments in broadly accepted values, articulate those values, and defend
its judgments forthrightly. It must develop a basis for substantively
adjudicating collisions of First Amendment interests that the people
and the other branches and levels of government can embrace as
democratically legitimate. 35 6 It must ensure that its approach to First
Amendment collisions keeps faith with democracy, both by respecting
the proper authority of elected officials and by vigorously enforcing
the First Amendment. The final section of this Article contends that
the Court can meet this challenge by asking, as to each case of colliding First Amendment interests, one central question: which competing interest, if it prevails in the circumstances of the case, will go
further toward advancing participation in the institutions and
processes of democratic self-government?
355 See Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 32 (2001) (positing that the decision to remand contestable constitutional questions to the political
process is itself a contestable decision); Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Characterof
JudicialReview, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 (1952) (noting that the judicial refusal to
decide a constitutional question amounts to upholding the constitutionality of challenged government action).
356 Although my formulation of participation-enhancing review addresses the
Court's countermajoritarian concern about substantive resolution of First Amendment collisions, the people's demonstrated ability to affect the shape of constitutional
judicial review over time should form part of the context for assessing that concern.
See generally Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2596, 2613-29 (2003) (discussing the capacity of public opinion to constrain judicial
autonomy).
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Participation-EnhancingReview as a ConstitutionalBasis for
Resolving First Amendment Collisions

This final section proposes a basis for substantive constitutional
adjudication of cases that present colliding First Amendment interests. The starting point for my prescription is the theory of representation-reinforcing review, which anchors judicial review in the dictates
of democracy in order to justify the sort of assertive constitutional
judging that the Court in First Amendment collision cases has worked
so hard to avoid. Limitations of classic representation-reinforcing
review prevent it from supporting adjudication of First Amendment
collisions. Those limitations fall away, however, if we modify the theory of representation reinforcement by taking a substantive rather
than merely formal view of what meaningful participation in democratic processes entails. This substantive participation value gives constitutional priority to enhancing the informative and inclusive
dimensions of democratic discourse, and it can thus animate judicial
review of First Amendment collision cases. The result, participationenhancing review, gives courts a normative framework, grounded in
widely shared democratic commitments, for resolving First Amendment collisions. By offering a proceduralist solution, I do not mean to
embrace the view that countermajoritarian concerns should limit judicial review to process corrections. 357 I simply propose a basis for substantively resolving First Amendment collisions that directly addresses
the Court's reason for resorting to denial and deference.
1.

The Value and Limits of Representation-Reinforcing Review

The foregoing discussion attributed the Court's futile pursuit of
neutrality in adjudicating colliding First Amendment interests to our
legal culture's discomfort with unelected judges' supposed encroachment on elected officials' policymaking authority.3 58 The most substantial theoretical effort to accommodate this countermajoritarian
difficulty has been the theory of representation-reinforcing judicial
review, articulated by Justice Stone in footnote four of United States v.
357 Three important insights challenge the premises of procedural theories of
judicial review: that legislatures do not reflect the people's will to the extent procedural theories assume; that courts reflect the people's will to a greater extent than procedural theories assume; and that the judicial role in our system contributes to, rather
than detracts from, our Constitution's conception of democracy. I incorporate these
insights to defendjudicial enforcement of expressive access rights in Magarian, supra
note 5, at 1406-29.
358

See supra notes 346-55 and accompanying text.
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Carolene Products Co. 3 5 9 and crystallized most fully by John Hart Ely in
Democracy and Distrust.360 The theory of representation reinforcement
has two distinct elements. The first emerges from the Carolene Products
suggestion that courts should not treat "legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation"3 61 as presumptively constitutional. That idea, in Ely's elaboration, justifies judicial review of certain breakdowns in the democratic process itself.3 62 The second
element of representation reinforcement emerges from the Carolene
Products suggestion that courts properly could invoke their constitutional authority to remedy "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities. '3 63 That idea, for Ely, justifies judicial review, primarily
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, of cer364
tain kinds of governmental attacks on minority groups' interests.
The second, "minority protection" element of representation reinforcement arguably has been the theory's most practically important
contribution to our law, and it has drawn the theory's heaviest
criticism. 365
The first element of representation-reinforcing review, the political process theory, provides a starting point for validating substantive
adjudication of First Amendment collisions. The political process theory, as a justification for courts' overruling elected officials' policy
choices, rests on the insight that our democratic system depends for
its legitimacy on accurate representation.3 66 Where malfunctions in
the political process produce elected branches of government that do
not represent the people accurately, then the elected branches'
authority is not truly democratic, and no basis exists for the concern
that judicial review will override legitimate democratic policymaking.3 6 7 Ely's elaboration of the political process theory derived
359

304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
ELY, supra note 1, at 73-104.
361
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
362 See ELY, supra note 1, at 105-34.
363 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
364 See ELY, supra note 1, at 135-79.
365 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 717
(1985) (accepting the utility of the "political process" element of Carolene Products but
strongly critiquing the "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" formulation); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 784-88 (1991) (finding criticisms of Ely's "minority protection" argument
convincing while defending Ely's "political process" argument).
366 See ELY, supra note 1, at 81-84.
367 See id. at 101-04 (advocating representation-reinforcing review as consistent
with democracy).

360
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authority for judicial review from an ideal of democratic participation. 3 6 8 He explained judicial remediation of procedural breakdowns
as proper to ensure "the opportunity to participate ... in the political
processes by which values are appropriately identified and accommodated."3 69 Critics immediately objected that, contrary to Ely's
proceduralist rhetoric, his explanation of judicial review as necessary
to effectuate democratic participation necessarily entails a substantive
value choice. 3 70 Given the force of those criticisms, the most constructive way to understand Ely's foundational reliance on democratic participation is that democratic participation does encompass substantive
values that are broadly accepted by the majority and/or ingrained in
broadly shared constitutional understandings-values, in other words,
37 1
that transcend the countermajoritarian difficulty.
Ely's effort to withstand countermajoritarian objections came at
the cost of advancing a somewhat impoverished notion of democratic
participation, which I will call the formal participation value. For Ely,
the need to protect democratic participation excused judicial interference with legislative prerogatives because participation generates
effective representation.3 72 On the most basic level, participation for
Ely meant electoral enfranchisement.3 73 Thus, Ely's political process
theory defended the Warren Court's voting rights precedents on the
basis that formal disenfranchisement prevented the excluded citizens
from exercising political authority over their representatives. 3 74 In
addition, Ely recognized the importance of political speech as "critical
'3 75
to the functioning of an open and effective democratic process.
Thus, Ely defended the Warren Court's free speech precedents as
aspects of his political process theory, on the basis that suppression of
368

See id. at 73-77.

369 Id. at 77. Ely also employed a different sense of democratic participation to
explain the minority protection element of his theory. See id. (positing that judicial
authority to protect minorities ensures "the opportunity to participate . . . in the
accommodation [political] processes have reached").
370 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067-72 (1980) (contending that any commitment to democratic participation must draw upon substantive values to determine the details of
what participation means); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of 7own: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045-48 (1980) (criticizing Ely's explanations of participation as a procedural justification for judicial

review).
371
372
373
374
375

Ely himself anticipated this necessary elision. See ELY, supra note 1, at 75 n.*.
See id. at 105-25.
See id. at 117.
See id. at 116-25 (discussing judicial review of voting procedures).
Id. at 105.
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political speech prevented the putative speaker from exercising a different sort of political influence over her representatives.3 7 6 Ely's
emphasis on representation, however, largely sublimates his account
of participation. His theory simply aims to ensure that representatives
can credibly claim to speak for all people constitutionally entitled to
participate in their selection. As the critics of this proceduralist conception of participation charge, he never explains why, and to what
extent, enhancing participation makes our democratic system better.3

77

Ely's resolution to avoid slippage into substantive values pre-

cludes any consideration of "better." His theory comprehends only
"good enough"-good enough democratic participation to ensure
accurate representation.
Ely's reliance on the formal participation value imposes important practical limits on his political process defense of judicial review.
Those limits are visible from two different angles. First, in a formulation that continues to ground our understanding of representation
reinforcement, Ely analogized his vision of appropriate constitutional
judicial review to market correction under the antitrust laws.
"[R]ather than dictate substantive results," he declared, courts should
intervene "only when the 'market,' in our case the political market, is
systematically malfunctioning." 378 Second, Ely tied the scope of the
political process theory to intentional governmental meddling with
the proper workings of democratic processes. His account of constitutional expressive freedom, for example, prescribes rigorous categorical review of regulations targeted at dangerous or unpopular messages
but leaves regulations that incidentally limit speech subject only to a
balancing analysis whose stringency largely depends on the danger of
their covert intent to target messages.3 7 9 These two limitations ultimately collapse into one: courts properly may substitute their judgment about democratic processes for the judgment of the legislature
only when a political majority has willfully leveraged its legal authority
in order to suppress formal participation by a political minority"when... the ins are choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out. '380 Implicit in
this approach is the corollary that only the political process itself can
376 See id. at 105-16 (discussing judicial review of speech regulations).
377 See Tribe, supra note 370, at 1070-72 (arguing that process-based theory
requires a substantive account of political community and political interactions);
Tushnet, supra note 370, at 1047-48 (criticizing political process theory for providing
an insufficient account of the relationship between participation and democracy).
378 ELY, supra note 1, at 102-03.
379

See id. at 111-12.

380

Id. at 103.
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repair any asserted flaws in its own workings not traceable to deliberate abuses of governmental authority.
The formal participation value's limits prevent representationreinforcing review, as manifested in Ely's political process theory,
from providing a way out of the Court's majoritarian aversion to
resolving First Amendment collisions. First, Ely's approach necessarily
precludes any account of what substantive values might guide adjudication of First Amendment collisions. His version of expressive freedom does not address the breadth and depth of political debate-the
need for a system of free expression to bring the widest possible range
of perspectives and participants into public discourse. 3 81 About the
Religion Clauses he says very little, only conceding that they embody
substantive concerns 382 and then mentioning religious freedom as an
instance of minority protection. 383 Second, few if any of the First
Amendment collision cases involve the sort of willful governmental
interference with democratic processes that justify Ely's "market corrections." Expressive access cases arise when a putative speaker complains that one, presumably unintended, consequence of the
government's distribution of social benefits, such as broadcasting
licenses and zoning variances, is that the recipient of those benefits
has used the power they confer to exclude the putative speaker. Religious accommodation cases, by definition, involve applications to religious believers of neutral, generally applicable laws, or decisions to
exempt believers from the force of such laws. Government in the
religious speech cases withholds certain resources from religious
speakers, but it does so based on the dictates of the Establishment
Clause. None of these scenarios raises the sort of procedural concern
on which Ely focused.
The failure of representation-reinforcing review to reach cases of
colliding First Amendment interests appears to validate the Court's
determination to avoid substantive resolution of First Amendment collisions, returning us to square one. However, a principle of decision is
381 Ely makes only one oblique reference to a problem of expressive access. In
describing the proper balancing analysis for regulations that only incidentally suppress speech, he suggests that "a more serious threat should be required [to justify the
regulation] when there is doubt that the speaker has other effective means of reaching the same audience." Id. at 111.
382 See id. at 94.
383 See id. at 100 (emphasizing the role of the Free Exercise Clause in protecting
minority religious believers and comparing its function to that of the Equal Protection Clause). Ely's only other allusion to the Establishment Clause also appears in his
discussion of minority protection. See id. at 141 (discussing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393

U.S. 97 (1968)).
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available that, like the formal participation value, embodies democratic commitments sufficiently basic to alleviate concerns about judicial excess, while improving on the formal participation value's sense
of democratic participation. Articulating that principle requires consideration of why, beyond Ely's account, we value democratic participation, and how participation benefits from the various interests
protected by the First Amendment.
2.

The Substantive Participation Value and ParticipationEnhancing Review of First Amendment Collisions

The significance of First Amendment collisions for the health of
our democratic system lies in how differences between the litigants'
participatory opportunities can affect the vitality of democratic
processes. Behind individuals' formal interest in participating in
selecting their representatives stands a systemic interest in ensuring
that people with a wide range of viewpoints and from a diverse set of
social backgrounds participate in debate about matters of public concern. In contrast to Ely's formal participation value, I call this systemic interest the substantive participation value.

Emphasis on the

substance of democratic participation fosters a healthy democracy in
two important ways. First, maximizing the range of viewpoints present
in public debate ensures that collective decisions about important policy questions-including but not limited to the election of representatives-will benefit from as much of society's accumulated wisdom
(and also its informative stupidity) as possible. This is the informational benefit of democratic participation. Second, maximizing the
range of participants present in public debate-rich and poor, old
and young, members of diverse racial, religious, and experiential communities-ensures that as many people as possible will recognize and
manifest their stakes in the collective decisions of the political community. This is the inclusive benefit of democratic participation. Both
the informational and inclusive aspects of the substantive participation value depend on diversity in democratic participation. These
benefits therefore highlight the instrumental importance of expressive dissension and religious pluralism for a healthy democratic
system.
Cases of colliding First Amendment interests, as discussed above,
do not fit the template of representation-reinforcing review because
they do not necessarily entail deliberate discrimination by political
majorities against minorities.3 8 4 Outcomes in colliding First Amend384

See supra Part II.B.1.
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ment cases, however, can make important differences in the informational and inclusive character of democratic processes. Any claim for
expressive access or religious accommodation seeks to alter the balance of public discourse-to increase the force or influence of one
expressive or religious perspective at the expense of another. We cannot rely on elected officials to resolve these conflicting dynamics of
participation any more than we can overlook the "market failures"
that Ely emphasized elected officials impose on representation,
because the substantive participation value, like the formal participation value, derives from bedrock constitutional requirements for our
democratic system. 38 5 Accordingly, cases in which First Amendment
interests collide require courts to step back from Ely's focus on the
integrity of democratic representation to assess a dispute's impact on
the character of democratic discourse itself.3 8 6 Applying the substan-

tive participation value to collisions of First Amendment interests
compels courts to inquire which of the colliding interests in a given
case better serves to advance our system's overall interest in optimizing the informational and inclusive benefits of democratic discourse.
This inquiry defines participation-enhancingreview.

Participation-enhancing review applies intuitively to expressive
access cases. A familiar tradition in First Amendment theory, exemplified by the work of Alexander Meiklejohn, identifies a healthy democratic process as the primary aim of speech protection.3 87 Elsewhere, I
have advocated a version of this approach, which I call the public
rights theory of expressive freedom. 38 8 Theorists in the public rights
tradition, most pointedly Jerome Barron, 389 have derived from this
democracy-centered conception of free speech a commitment to
expressive access rights, or at least ample allowance for legislative and
385 On a practical level, structural problems in our electoral system have frayed the
lines of political accountability necessary to motivate the elected branches to advance
the informational and inclusive benefits of democratic participation. See Magarian,
supra note 5, at 1413-24.
386 In this sense, the substantive participation value offers a partial response to
objections that Ely's account of democratic participation pays insufficient attention to
the normative shape participation should take. See supra note 370 and accompanying

text.
387 See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 42 (arguing that freedom of speech
"is the basic postulate of a society which is governed by the votes of its citizens").
388 See generally Magarian, supranote 48, at 1972-91 (contrasting the private rights
theory and the public rights theory).
389 See generally BARRON, supra note 3, at 300-03 (analyzing the state of access
rights to various forms of media and arguing that a right of access for minorities "is
one way of grappling with both the enbrmous power of the mass media and the difficulty of mass participation in it").
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regulatory access reforms.3 9 0 The Court in recent decades has almost
completely abandoned the public rights theory in favor of an alternative I have labeled the private rights theory of expressive freedom,
which safeguards against government interference the expressive
autonomy of those who already possess the means to speak.3 9I The
Court's wholesale denial in the expressive access setting of First
Amendment access rights in favor of a single-minded commitment to
expressive autonomy bespeaks the private rights theory's dominance.
Participation-enhancing review, in contrast, would not entail any fundamental choice between the two theories. A judge in a given case
could hold, within the boundaries of participation-enhancing review,
that vindication of expressive autonomy best advanced the substantive
participation value. 392 Participation-enhancing review only precludes
the Court's present position that expressive access cases present no
occasion for substantive constitutional adjudication, either because no
First Amendment interest beyond autonomy exists or because elected
officials, not judges, should decide which distribution of expressive
393
opportunities comports with the First Amendment.
We generally view the Religion Clauses as protecting substantive
rather than procedural interests. 3 94 Religious accommodation cases,
however, represent a legal Waterloo for those substantive interests:
the tension between free exercise interests in accommodation and
nonestablishment concerns about accommodation has led the Court
390 On the divergence between proposals for expressive access rights and expressive access reforms, see Magarian, supra note 5, at 1376-88.
391 See Magarian, supra note 48, at 1980-88.
392 Indeed, no democracy-focused free speech theory denies that expressive
autonomy plays an important role in advancing effective democratic government. See
C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 129-53 (2002) (discussing the
instrumental value of media autonomy under various democratically grounded conceptions of press freedom); Magarian, supra note 298, at 151-55 (discussing the role
of autonomy in a public rights theory of expressive freedom); Robert C. Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &

MARY

L. REV. 267, 284 (1991)

(describing expressive freedom as necessary to reconcile individual autonomy with
collective self-government).
393 Because expressive access cases typically involve putative speakers' claims of
access rights to nominally private expressive property, substantive judicial resolution
that takes access interests into account would require altering the normative terms of
the public-private distinction. Elsewhere I have argued that the public-private distinction should shield the expressive autonomy of natural persons, while courts should
assess the rights and obligations of nongovernmental institutions based on each institution's instrumental value for democratic discourse. See Magarian, supra note 298, at
146-72.
394 See, e.g., Tribe, supranote 370, at 1065 (characterizing the Religion Clauses as
"[p]lainly... substantive").
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almost completely to foreswear constitutional adjudication.3 9 5 The
substantive participation value, while not the primary object of either
Religion Clause, provides a path through the Court's reticence. The
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause share a role in setting normatively desirable terms for democratic discourse. Religious
identity and experience can go far toward shaping a person's or
group's democratic participation. Government suppression of a given
religious belief or practice, even if inadvertent, can marginalize religious believers by forcing them to choose between legal authority and
their religious convictions, discouraging them from engaging with the
political community. On the other hand, special government solicitude for a given religious belief or practice can elevate the status of
the beneficiaries, thereby denigrating adherents of other faiths and
nonbelievers. Justice O'Connor's notion that an improper state
endorsement of religion "sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community" 39 6 goes some distance toward
capturing this democratic dimension of religious status.3 9 7 The substantive participation value would incline courts to favor egalitarian
accommodations necessary to prevent political marginalization of
religious minorities3 9 8 and idiosyncratic accommodations with sufficiently narrow scope or subject matter to avoid or obviate the estab3 99
lishment danger of privileging religious status or belief.
Conversely, courts under participation-enhancing review would disfavor accommodations that benefited politically powerful institutions or
enhanced political power based on religion.
Participation-enhancing review necessarily discards representation-reinforcing review's requirement of intentional government
395 See supra Part I.B.3.
396 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
397 Other efforts to understand the Religion Clauses in democratic terms include
Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YAE L.J. 1611,
1614-40 (1993) (positing that the Establishment Clause excludes religious values
from the political sphere while the Free Exercise Clause excludes political authority
from the religious sphere); Sullivan, supra note 336, at 198 (contending that the
Religion Clauses protect "religious liberty insofar as it is consistent with the establishment of the secular public moral order").
398 On the desirability and constitutional viability of egalitarian accommodations
in the context of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), invalidated in part by City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997), see Magarian, supra note 136, at 1992-95.
399 On the desirability and constitutional viability of idiosyncratic accommodations, again in the context of RFRA, see Magarian, supra note 136, at 1995-97.
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interference with democratic processes, because First Amendment
400
collisions rarely reveal the fingerprints of such deliberate abuse.
While the logic of representation-reinforcing review does not compel
the intent requirement, the requirement bolsters the formal participation value's constraint on judicial discretion. 40 1 That additional measure of constraint, however, carries a steep cost. At the extreme,
intent analysis can warp constitutional doctrine beyond recognition,
as in its essential contribution to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
position that the Equal Protection Clause primarily serves to prevent
racial discrimination against white people. 40 2 In the context of First
Amendment collisions, the intent requirement abandons constitutional disputes to the vagaries of unstated or unconscious legislative
motives, whose unintended consequences play out in the economic
market. In the distribution of opportunities for democratic participation, neither legislative instinct nor market exchange produces random outcomes. A majority Christian legislature-the only kind found
in this country-can favor Christian perspectives or disregard the perspectives of believers in minority faiths without the slightest ill intent.
The economic market inherently privileges the perspectives of wealthier speakers, a salient bias for all manner of important policy debates.
We should expect better than unintentionally biased outcomes in disputes that implicate such matters of core constitutional concern as
expression and religion. The risk that judges, although limited by the
substantive participation value, might nonetheless find openings for
their subjective preferences is a fair price to pay for the guarantee that
the branch charged with constitutional interpretation will enforce the
First Amendment in democratically salient disputes about free speech
and religious liberty.
Some will object to participation-enhancing review's directive
that courts make certain qualitative assessments in the sensitive areas
of speech and religion. Robert Post exemplifies this sort of objection
in the distinctive context of decision rules for allocating government
400

See supra Part II.B.1.

401 See Klarman, supra note 365, at 761 n.68 (acknowledging that political process
theory can encompass racial and religious discrimination but opposing such an extension because "it would require courts to undertake inevitably speculative inquiries").
402 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (striking
down a federal minority set-aside program as a violation of equal protection); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (finding that a challenge to an electoral district
designed to remedy discrimination against African Americans stated an equal protection cause of action). Ely, although committed to the intent requirement, avoided
the Court's fallacious fixation on "reverse discrimination" by determining that, under
the representation reinforcement theory, the white majority cannot discriminate
against itself. See ELY, supra note 1, at 170-72.
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subsidies, arguing that judicial evaluation of the relative marginalization of ideas in public debate would be impractical at best and impermissibly content-based at worst. 40 3 Post is right to call attention to the
practical challenges of evaluating social power differentials as part of
constitutional adjudication and to warn against the danger of bias in
making such evaluations. I believe he is wrong, however, to presume
that courts can coherently, let alone fairly, resolve conflicts rooted in
power differentials through a filter of neutrality that obscures those
differentials. 40 4 This Article has shown that the Court's denial of
expressive access rights and deconstitutionalization of religious
accommodation disputes has covertly yielded normatively biased outcomes. Participation-enhancing review would, at worst, compel forthright and transparent assessments of First Amendment collisions. In
addition, I feel confident that more people would find the substantive
participation value consistent with their understanding of courts as
legitimate actors in our democratic system than the Court's normative
bias toward the status quo. Even if we accept at face value the Court's
professions of neutrality in its approach to First Amendment collisions, its queasiness about assessing expressive access disputes' and
religious accommodation decisions' effects on democratic participation leaves those effects to legislative discretion and the market.
Opponents of such judicial assessments offer no persuasive reason to
prefer those forces to judges where important constitutional values
hang in the balance.
Participation-enhancing review will raise a more general concern
among originalists40 5 and judicial minimalists, 40 6 two groups that
strive against any allowance for subjectivity in constitutional adjudication. The substantive participation value undeniably carries greater
normative content than Ely's formal participation value. 40 7 Itreaches
403 See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 188-89 (1996).
404 Indeed, First Amendment doctrine focuses directly on power differentials
when it takes special care to protect inexpensive means of expression. See Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (emphasizing, in striking down an online "indecency" ban, that the Internet "provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds"); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) (indicting a
municipal ban on most residential signs as restricting "an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication").
405 See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 293, at 143-60 (articulating and defending an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation).
406 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 259-63 (1999) (arguing for the
desirability of judicial minimalism on prudential and political grounds).
407 Others have suggested different ways in which Ely's procedural concerns might
flower into justifications for more normatively robust varieties of judicial review. See
Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1533 (2002) (advo-
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beyond the basic structural fact of democratic representation to
advance a view about the broader character of democratic discourse.
Even so, participation-enhancing review proceeds from understandings about our democratic system-and aspirations for it-that most
members of our political community share. The formal participation
value can underwrite judicial review whether one believes representatives should act as agents of their constituents' prepolitical interests or
40 8
as trustees of their constituents' politically determined interests.
The substantive participation value likewise can underwrite judicial
review of First Amendment collisions under either of the most broadly
recognized normative strands in our democratic fabric: liberal pluralism and civic republicanism. The pluralist ideal places great emphasis
on the importance of effective political confrontations among different interest groups' material priorities. 40 9 The substantive participation value can advance that ideal by helping to ensure that democratic
processes accurately represent the variety and intensity of competing
preferences. The republican ideal emphasizes the importance of
deliberative discourse in pursuit of the common good. 410 The substantive participation value can advance that ideal by helping to
ensure that public deliberation encompasses every available viewpoint. Participation-enhancing review commits courts to show particular concern for dissident and minority perspectives, a commitment
that comports in different ways with both the pluralist and republican
ideals.
Participation-enhancing review, like representation-reinforcing
review, does not dictate inevitable outcomes in particular cases. The
salience of dissent and difference for the substantive participation
value necessarily focuses judicial attention on the relative strength of
litigants' opportunities for participation in democratic discourse.
Inevitably and appropriately, however, differentjudges will take different views of what constitutes an underrepresented point of view or an
unacceptable burden on a person's or group's ability to participate
cating judicial examination of public reasons for burdens on individual liberty as a
species of representation-reinforcing review); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and
Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J.
1279, 1293-1317 (2005) (proposing an extension of representation-reinforcing
review based on contemporary conditions of pluralist democracy).
408 See HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 127-31 (1967) (distinguishing agency and trusteeship models of representation).
409 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 407, at 1302-05 (suggesting that proper representation-reinforcing review in speech cases should protect the ability of opposing

groups to associate for expressive purposes).
410 See generally Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4,
17-55 (1986) (discussing the civic republican tradition).
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meaningfully in democratic discourse. In some expressive access cases
the autonomy interest will prevail, while in others the access interest
will prevail. Courts will grant some religious accommodations under
the Free Exercise Clause while denying others under the Establishment Clause. Courts in some cases will ratify regulatory efforts to
resolve First Amendment collisions as consistent with the substantive
participation value. All participation-enhancing review requires is for
every court that confronts a collision of First Amendment interests to
reach its result-and justify the result to the people-in terms of the
court's own best sense of the substantive participation value. Brief
reexamination of an emblematic case from each category of First
Amendment collisions suggests how that assessment could work.
The substantive participation value acknowledges our self-governing society's powerful interest in opening public debate to the widest possible range of speakers and viewpoints, to inform the people
about alternatives to the status quo and to give dissenters an active
stake in the democratic process. In Hurley different understandings of
that value could have caused either the parade organizers or the gay
marchers to prevail under participation-enhancing review. 4 1I Rather
than denying the gay marchers' expressive access interest, the analysis
would begin by recognizing that both sides presented serious First
Amendment interests. The outcome would turn on which of those
interests appeared less securely protected by the political status quo
and, accordingly, which result would make democratic discourse more
informative and inclusive. The court might have concluded that the
parade organizers' exclusion of the gay marchers conveyed or preserved a message of traditional values, distinction between ethnic
pride and identity politics, and/or opposition to substantive elements
of the gay-lesbian political agenda unlikely to find comparable outlets
elsewhere in public debate. On the other hand, the Court might have
decided that the parade offered the gay marchers a unique and
important platform from which to confront entrenched prejudice or
disapproval.
Participation-enhancing review takes account of religious accommodations' value for ensuring religious believers' ability to participate
fully in democratic processes and also of religious accommodations'
danger for making religious faith a basis for undue enhancements in
societal or political status. In Smith those considerations might have
cut either way, but they necessarily would have precluded the actual
Smith doctrine of radical deference. 41 2 The Native Americans who
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sought relief in Smith from the effects of Oregon's drug laws on their
sacramental use of peyote undeniably represented a community on
the political and religious margins. Accordingly, participationenhancing review would have offered a strong basis for concluding
that they needed the requested accommodation in order to maximize
their engagement with the political community at large, while their
minority status and highly idiosyncratic request diminished any risk of
establishment from the accommodation. Conversely, the Court might
have rejected the accommodation claim, either because the choice to
which Oregon's law put the Native Americans did not seriously undermine their capacity for full participation in democratic discourse or
because the accommodation would have deviated so powerfully from
generally applicable law that, notwithstanding the beneficiaries'
minority status and the accommodation's idiosyncratic character,
granting it would have sent a chilling message to nonbelievers about
41 3
the political importance of religion.
The religious speech cases juxtapose the substantive participation
value's imperative to protect dissent against its imperative to promote
religious inclusion while avoiding undue elevation of religion. Given
those considerations, participation-enhancing review would have
focused the Court in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Vir-

ginia4 14 on the complex interaction between the dynamics of robust
public discourse and the political salience of religious belief. The
University in Rosenberger denied a Christian student group an otherwise generally available subsidy for student publications. 4 15 The
Court's determination whether that exclusion undermined the substantive participation value would have turned on at least three axes.
First, the Court would have needed to fix the relevant frame of reference for assessing the University policy's impact. Christian perspectives-the subjects of all the religious speech cases 4 16-exert
considerable influence in the United States generally, and probably
greater influence in Virginia. On the other hand, Christian perspectives might well be in short supply at a large state university. Second,
the Court would have needed to consider whether the University's
413 Participation-enhancing review would allow courts to reject religious accommodation claims based on government interests unrelated to the Establishment
Clause. In sharp contrast to the Court's reflexive deference under Smith, however,
attention to the substantive participation value would require courts to measure
asserted government interests against a substantial conception of free exercise, in the
manner of heightened constitutional scrutiny.
414 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see supra note 268 and accompanying text.
415 See id. at 823-27.
416 See supra Part I.B.3.c.
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freedom to effectuate a distinctive educational mission contributed
more to democratic discourse, at least in the circumstances of this
case, than the Christian group's ability to bring its faith to bear on
public debate. Finally, whereas the actual Rosenberger majority
shrugged off the nonestablishment justification for the University's
policy, 417 participation-enhancing review would have required the
Court to assess carefully the shape and severity of the establishment
concern. Did the University's policy simply disadvantage the Christian
group relative to comparable organizations, or did it preserve a key
barrier between the governmental and religious spheres?
The foregoing examples demonstrate that the inquiries that the
substantive participation value mandates-the particular standards for
participation in a healthy democracy, the relative degree of different
ideas' or speakers' representation in public debate, a given religious
accommodation's likely costs and benefits for democratic participation-elude easy resolution and invite some measure of subjective
analysis. The substantive participation value, however, carries sufficiently clear meaning to foreclose most normatively divisive judicial
freelancing, and it embodies ideas about democracy that our society
broadly accepts. Participation-enhancing review serves democratic
values in the same manner as representation-reinforcing review,
equipping courts with a substantive understanding of democracy and
charging them with ensuring that resolutions of democratically salient
legal disputes reflect that understanding.
CONCLUSION

This Article calls on courts to do something that disturbs many
people: apply a necessarily broad normative framework to an important class of constitutional disputes. Participation-enhancing review of
colliding First Amendment interests would require judges to consider
whether ruling in favor of this putative speaker without means or that
owner of expressive property, this legally burdened religious practitioner or that wary nonbeliever, would do more to advance our society's common interest in fostering informative, inclusive democratic
participation. The theory allows for vindication of constitutional
rights where the government has not discriminated intentionally, and
the legal inquiry requires subjective judgment and leaves space for
divergent outcomes. Skeptics, however, should consider the present
alternative. The Supreme Court has demonstrated, relentlessly, how
First Amendment collisions play out absent participation-enhancing
review. Confronted with tension between two constitutional interests,
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the Court denies that one of the interests exists or matters. When
government regulation-or, in the case of the Religion Clauses, the
constitutional text-renders denial untenable, the Court defers evaluation of the constitutional interests at stake to the elected branches.
These techniques of denial and deference aim to avoid excessive
interference with elected officials' policymaking discretion.
In our system, however, the First Amendment supersedes elected
officials' policymaking discretion. If the Court's duty to interpret the
Constitution and impose its interpretation on disputes that implicate
constitutional values extends even to cases in which First Amendment
interests collide, then we need a theoretical basis for substantive judicial resolution of such cases. The theory this Article advocates, participation-enhancing review, proceeds from the same logic that fortifies
the familiar countermajoritarian salve of representation-reinforcing
review: it finds a basis for judicial action in our society's deeply
ingrained understandings about the requirements of participatory
democracy. Where representation-reinforcing review defends judicial
redress of governmental affronts to the political process based on a
formal participation value, participation-enhancing review extends
that defense to First Amendment collisions based on a substantive participation value. The substantive participation value embodies our
self-governing society's interest in informative, inclusive democratic
participation. It accordingly calls particular judicial attention to the
importance of dissent and difference for democratic discourse.
The present Court shows no inclination to reconsider its unduly
restrained approach to First Amendment collisions. My hope is that
participation-enhancing review's firm roots in our society's widely
shared commitment to democratic participation will make the theory
appealing in the future. The Constitution embodies our deepest democratic commitments, and the First Amendment's protections of
speech and religion stand among the most crucial of those commitments. When legal disputes implicate expressive or religious interests,
even if those interests clash, the Court should not elevate judicial
restraint over substantive analysis through a futile pursuit of neutral
decisional principles. Instead, it should assertively construe and apply
the Constitution's commands. Participation-enhancing review would
not fully obviate the majoritarian anxiety that judges, charged with
implementing broadly conceived normative principles, might at times
place their own subjective values above the will of the people's representatives. What participation-enhancing review would guarantee is
that the democratic values manifest in the First Amendment would
control the outcomes of the important legal disputes in which First
Amendment interests collide.

